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UNITED STAiES DISTRICT COURT
SO UTHERN DISTRICT O F FLO RIDA
Case No.11-20427-CIV-W ILLlAM S
DISNEY ENTERPRISES,INC.,efa/.,
Plaintils,
VS.

HOTFILE CORP.,etaI.,
Defendants.
/

O RDER
THIS M ATTER is before the Coud on severalpending m otions for sum m ary

judgment,which were filed undersealand in a public,butredacted form (DE 255,DE
275,DE 276,DE 280,DE 3O1,DE 316,DE 318,DE 322). In connection with this

briefing,the padiesfiled numerous related motions to strike (DE 217,DE 241,DE.339,
DE 452,DE 371,DE 387),supplementalbriefing permitted by the Coud (DE 474,DE
475),and additional,robustpleadings on supplementalauthority withoutIeave ofCoud

(DE 443,DE 444,DE 500,DE 501,DE 502,DE 503,DE 504,DE 505,DE 507,DE 509,
DE 5101 DE 5131 DE 514, DE 515T DE 5161 DE 5171 DE 523).1 Finally,the Coud
permitted the Electronic FrontierFoundation to file a briefas amicus curiae (DE 480).
The Coud addresses aII related filings in this O rder. To the extent that this O rder
discusses information considered by the padies to be business secrets, i
t will be
redacted in a public version ofthis decision.

1

As evinced by the volume of the briefing and the proceeding discussion,the
padies do notagree on m uch,there are m any facts asserted to be relevant,and
the Coud has been asked to weigh in on num erous unsettled Iegalissues.
1
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1-

BACKG ROUND

This case concerns the actions ofan off-shore technology com pany thatprovides

online file storage services,DefendantHotfile Corp.,and one ofits founders,Defendant

Anton Titov (collectively,liHotfile''or l
'Defendants''). Plaintiffs are five major media
studiosand entertainmentcompanies (collectively,the ddstudios')thathold copyrights on
various adistic w orks:

Disney Enterprises, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corporation, UniversalCity Studios Productions LLLP,Colum bia Pictures lndustries,

Inc.,and W arnerBros.Entedainment Inc.('W arner''). The gravamen ofthe Studios'
claim is that Hotfile's users have abused its system by sharing licensed m aterials
belonging to the Studios and thatHotfile and Titov are Iiable as a result.

The pending motions forsummaryjudgmentseek an adjudication thatHotfile's
activities are not (or are) entitled to a statutory safe harbor protection created by

Congress fifteen years ago in the DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct(''DMCA''),17 IJ.S.C.
â 1201,elseq.'
,thatHotfile is (oris not)Iiable forsecondary copyrightinfringementat
common Iaw;thatTitov is (oris not)personally liable forHotfile's activities asone ofits
corporate officers and founders'
,and thatW arneris notliable foritselfabusing a system
thatenabled itto rem ove works from Hoiile's system . Afterconsidering the extensive
factualrecord and applying the relevantIaw ,the Coud concludes that Defendants have

failed to m eet criteria necessary for safe harbor protection'
, that Defendants are
vicariously liable forthe actions ofHotfile's users,butthatquestions offactpreclude a
determ ination ofotherform s ofsecondary liability'
,thatTitov is individually liable forthe

actions ofhis company,such thathe willhave to share in whateverjudgmentHotfile is
deem ed to ow e;and thatHotfile m ay proceed on a counterclaim itfiled againstW arner

2
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relating to notices of infringem ent. This action willproceed to trialon aIIunresolved
issues ofIiability as wellas fora determ ination ofthe m easure ofdam ages.
A.

Hotfile's System

Hotfile,w hich began its operations on February 19,2009,is whatis known as an
online ''storage Iocker.'' The com pany operates an lnternet website that allows

registered users to take electronic files ofany type thatare stored on theircom puters or
other accessible Iocations and transfer them to Hotfile's electronic storage system

through an uploading process. As a result,a copy ofthatfile then exists on Hotfile's

servers.The website provides a simple interface between Hotfile users (and theirdata)

and Hotfile's storage network,connecting them with justa few computermouse clicks.
O nce a file is uploaded,the uploading userautom atically receives one or more unique
URL Iinks containing the file nam e and an extension. So,forexam ple,ifa useruploads
a piece of software called l'JDownloader''- which is a realprogram whose authors
voluntarily uploaded it through Hotfile's website - Hotfile would issue the user a link

location such as ''http://ho;ile.com/dl/14052520/7a3c8f8/JDownIoader% 20O.8.821.
zip.htm l.''As can be seen,the Iink generally gives som e indication ofthe file nam e,and
thus,its possible content. By entering thatlink into the address barofany Internetweb

browser on any com puter,the userm ay retrieve and download his file. Hotfile keeps
track ofthe date,tim e ofuse,and cedain userinform ation associated with the fiIe.2

2

This case revolves around em erging technologies,which requires the Coud to
give an overview of the relevant concepts. The padies have provided m ore
com prehensive inform ation and m ore sophisticated analyses,w hich are on file

withthe Coud. (See,e.g.,FosterDecl.(DE 325-17).)
3
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W hile an individual's actofuploading a file is ostensibly innocuous - and indeed,
othernetworks provide sim ilarsods ofservices - severalofHotfile's attributes facilitate

users'infringement ofcopyrights. First,while the uploading process places justone
copy ofthe file on Hotfile's servers,thatfile can be downloaded an unlim ited num berof
tim es. M oreover, there are no Iim itations as to how som eone can fudher use or

replicate the file.
Second,because the file is notsecure,itis accessible to anyone with an Internet

connection. It is im podant to note that Hotfile provides no index or search feature,
which m eans thatanyone trying to access a file m ustknow its exactIocation orURL -

the file is essentially hidden in plain sight. Nevedheless,ways existforotherusers to
Iearn about and gain access to files. Forinstance,Hotfile encourages users to share

file Iinks (and thus files)through an affiliate program ,which pays individualsto navigate
prospective dow nloaders to file Iocations. The incentives increase with the size ofthe

file and the frequency ofits download butwithoutregard to othercharacteristics the file

mightpossess (e.g.,ifitis entedainmentmediaversus utilitycomputersoftware orifitis
created by the userorcreated by someone eIse).3 ln practice,Hotfile's affiliates have
created theirown websites thatcatalogue files found on Hotfile,prom ote theirfiles,or
allow the public to search for files. In addition, uploading users can them selves
broadcast the download Iinks,such as by e-m ailing them to people they know or by

3

The amounts paid perfile - no more than $0.015 - are small,butin aggregate
have resulted in the paym ent of m illions of dollars to affiliates. Priorto 2012,
Hotfile also paid website owners a five percentcom m ission based on the number
of users who purchased prem ium subscriptions to Hotfile and had been referred
by such websites.
4
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advedising them through various channels. This has turned Hotfile into not only a
storage site,butalso a file distribution network.

Finally,because Hotfile protects users'privacy,i
t has effectively refrained from
interfering in any w ay with how its mem bers use the service. In the norm alcourse ofits
business, for exam ple, Hotfile does not review w hat its users are uploading,
downloading orprom oting. Indeed,as discussed below ,one ofHotfile's m ain defenses
in this action is that it is unaware of the nature ofthe content available and has no

affirm ative duty to m onitoruseractivities.
Hotfile has soughtto increase the use of its system and expand the rate offile
sharing because the corporation derives revenue through subscriberfees thatusers pay

to it. Indeed,this is Hotfile's sole source ofrevenue. W hile Hotfile is accessible to the

public and anyone can upload ordownload forfree,paying nine dollars perm onth for
S'prem ium ''status perm its uploaders to store their files for a Ionger period'
,otherwise,
files are autom atically deleted every three months. Moreover,prem ium users who seek

to download files benefitfrom easieraccess,fasterdow nload speeds,and the ability to
download files frequently'
,they would otherwise be restricted to one download every

thidy m inutes. Hotfile calculates that useractivity drives prem ium subscriptions while
rewarding users for giving away access to files they possess. For instance, it is

undisputed thatHoiile's affiliate program prom otes the use ofHotfile and leads users to
conved to prem ium status.

By any m easure, Hotfile's m odel has been effective at encouraging user

padicipation and driving grow th am ong dow nloading users,uploading users and a'Kiliate
m em bers. For instance,according to Hotfile's figures, 123 m illion files available on

5
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Hotfile's system have been downloaded 2.9 billion tim es - 145 m illion tim es alone in the
m onth preceding this l
awsuit- and have resulted in the registration of5.3 m illion users.

(Titov Deci.!(36 (DE 396-1).) Thishasworkeda significantfinancialbenefittoHotfile
and its founders.

B.

LegalC laim s atIssue

As alluded to above,these features - the ease of replication and dissem ination
of any type offile,the Iack of oversight regarding content,and the scale of Hotfile's

activi
ty - raise questions of Iiability forusers'illegalactivi
ties.4 In theirCom plaintfiled

on February 8,2O11 (DE 1),the Studios allege thatwhile Hotfile proclaims to be an
online personal storage site,

actually designed to provide a mechanism for

uploading and downloading users to engage in digitalpiracy,com plete w i
th a system of

4

S Ystem s w ith sim ilarcapabilities have faced carefulscrutiny. Forinstance,in the
late 1990s and early 200Os, copyright owners brought num erous successful
challenges to peer-to-peer file networks!w hich coordinated the transm ission of
media stored on users'com puters directly to otherusers,im posing liability on the
network operators for the conduct of their users. See, e.g., M etro-Goldwyn-

MayerStudios;Inc.v.Groksten Ltd.j545U.S.913 (2005)'
,A&M RecordstInc.v.
Napslec lnc.,239 F,3d 1004 (9th Cir.2001),
.AristaRecords LLC B.Lime Group
LLC, 784 F. Supp, 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) ('L/me Gro&p'
'). The system
challenged most recently M egaupload Lim ited, shuttered its service in earl
y
2012 and is facing potent!
lalcrim inaland civilliability in the Uni
ted States. See
Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-sharing Site, N.Y.Times,
Jan. 19,2012,at B1. W hile the parties have found it convenient to com pare
Hotfile to these system s,the Cotfrtpredicates its decision on the facts and law
presented by this record.
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financialincentives that fosters infringem ent. They assed that it is Hotfile's infringing
uses,notIegitim ate useractivity,thatdrives the com pany's business. The Studios bring

a claim forsecondaryinfringement(Count11).
,theirclaim fordirectinfringement(Count1)

was dismissed by priororderofthe Coud (DE 94). To frame the Iegalissues and put
into context the evidence discussed throughout this decision,the Coud provides the
follow ing sum m ary ofthe padies'posi
tions and theirkey evidence.
Although Iargely irrelevant to issues of Iiability,the cornerstone of the Studios'

case is a statistical analysis conducted by Dr. Richard W aterm an based on
classifications provided by their proffered copyright exped, M r.ScottA.Zebrak.5 The
repod concludes that 90.2% of the daily downloads on Hotfile are dow nloads of
''infringing'' or ''highly infringing'
' content and that only 5.3% of dow nloads are

noninfringing,with a 1.30/cmargin oferror. (W aterman Decl.jl!l22-23 (DE 325-6).)The
Studios also provide circum stantialand anecdotalevidence thatHotfile does notserve a

S

As explained in more detailbelow,couds have squarel
y rejected the Studios'
position that generalized evidence of infringement, such as Dr. W aterm an's
study,forecloses the statutory safe harborprotection afforded by the DM CA and
necessitates a finding of Iiability. Although the Studios cite to dicta suppoding
the proposition thatthe goals ofthe DM CA are inconsistentw i
th rewarding those

who knowingly contribute to infringement(but mean to protect innocentactors
who are engaged in beneficialapplications oftechnology),a Iitigantmustpointto
evidence ofknow n infringementpadicularto works thatthey ow n. Forinstance,

in Viacom Intj Inc.v.YouTube,Inc.,676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.2012),the Second
Circuit found that a defendant could not be said to have awareness of
infringem ent where an internal survey revealed that 75 to 80 percent of aII
content on the system was infringing. Id.at 32-34. As another case recently
sum m arized,''knowledge ofthe prevalence of infringing activity,and welcom ing
it, does not itself forfeit the safe harbor. To fofeit that, the provider m ust

influence orpadicipate in the infringement.'' Viacom Intj Inc.v.YouTube,/nc.,

No.07 Civ.2103 (LLS),2013 W L 1689071,at*5 (S.D.N.Y.Apr. 18,2013).
Outside the scope of the DMCA,generalknowledge of infringement is a factor
suppoding secondary liability for infringem entbut cannotestablish such Iiability
on its ow n.
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prim arily law fulpurpose,as discussed below. Fudher,they contend that Hotfile knows
about ram pant infringem ent of works owned by the Studios and others,that Hotfii
e
failed to rem ove infringing m aterialordisable the accounts ofusers who uploaded such

material despite having received eight million infringement notices from copyright
holders, and that Hotfile and i
ts uploading users have profited from the infringing
activity. As a result,the Studios contend thatHotfile is Iiable undervarious theories of
secondary copyrightinfringem entand that itcannotavailitselfofa safe harbor created
in favorofservice providers by Congress through Section 512 ofthe DM CA .
Forits part,Hotfile podrays itselfas anything buta pirate network. Hotfile and its
founders claim that the corporation's business m odelis not unusualforthe industry.
A nd they contend thatthe system is used predom inantly forstorage and otherlegi
tim ate

uses, such as di
stributing non-licensed software; Mspace shi
ftingn (i.e., enabling

individualusers to access their media through anotherdevice they ownl'
,and the

sharing ofmedia thatis eithercreated by users (such as videos to promote political
change),freely Iicensed (oral
togethernotcopyrighted),ortoo large to send by other
m ethods. For exam ple, Hotfile points to the fact tha

Further, through its expeds, Hotfil
e attem pts to underm ine the Studios'

infringem entanalyses,contending thatthe W aterm an study exam ined only a one-m onth

period of data from January 2011 (leaving the possibility but hugely improbabl
e

6

NootherPiaintiffsappeartohavedoneso.
8
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Iikelihood thatthere was a zero percent infringem entrate in otherm onths priorto this

lawsuit) and improperly excluded entire categories offiles,such as those with adul
t
content,which is often given away with the copyrightholders'perm ission,and public
dom ain m aterial,including works whose copyrights have expired. Hotfile does concede

that,at least to som e degree,infringem ent has occurred through its system and the
availability of infringing files drives conversions

paid prem ium

accounts.

Nonetheless,to the extentthatinfringem entdid transpire on its system ,Hotfile claim s to

have been unaware ofit.
Hotfile also asserts thatto the extentthis Iitigation has highlighted ways itcould

betterpolice the activityofits users,ithas done so (even ifitwas notrequired to). This
appears to be true. Forexam ple,when aleded by the Studios'Iawsuitto the presence
ofinfringing content,Hotfile im plem ented S'powerfulcounterm easures''against lnternet
piracy,such as adopting filtering technologies and term inating large num bers ofrepeat

infringers,that go beyond the m ost rudim entary foils to such activities. ln this way,
Hotfile advances the claim thatitis a sm all,foreign com pany thathas done everything
possible to investigate its users'backgrounds,im plem ent counterm easures to defeat

piracy,and comply with United States copyri
ghtIaw (with which itsays itwas notalways

familiar). Finally,Hotfile asseds thatthe Studios have an impropermotive in bringing
this Iawsuit, claim ing that they stood witness to, and were com plicit in, the alleged
violations in orderto drive dam ages and recoverposthoc.
C.

Evidence ofHotfile's Intent

The padies have diam etrically differentviews ofHotfile's aim s and have devoted
m uch space to debating whetherHotfile setoutto serve a legitimate purpose. Hotfile

9
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acknow ledges that at its inception,it m odeled itself after Rapidshare,another online
storage Iockerw ebsite. Notably,copyrightholders eventually claim ed that Rapidshare
w as used forinfringem entand broughtsui
t againstit in June 2010 to shutthe network
dow n. Hotfile was aware of Rapidshare's problem s. Afterthe Rapidshare Iaw suitwas
filed,one of Hotfile's co-founders,

,sentan e-m ailto Titov noting an

increase intrafficonHotfile'ssystem andremarking,ulwlhatan unexpectedgiftwe have
from Rapidshare :) The badthing isthattheycleanup theirimagewhile we becolme

the fiagshipofnon-licensed content.' (Yeh Decl.Ex.53 (DE 288-58 (filed underseal;
DE 324-11).) One month Iater,

spectllated thatone reason that''ourprosts

increased so rapidly''was that ''Hollywood has closed 3-4 large websites for illegal

movies and thatcould have redirected usersto us.''(Yeh Decl.Ex.49 (DE 288-54 (filed

under seall'
, DE 324-11).) Titov responded to thate-mailby specificall
y naming
Rapi
dshare.
Apad from the generalized statistics highlighted earlier, the Studios have
provided a pastiche ofevidence related to Hotfii
e's business m odel,design and use tl
nat
they contend m akes a circum stantialcase thatHotfil
e understood itwas m aking illegal
contentavailable fordistribution and tacitly fostering such activity. Forinstance,the fact

that Hotfile encouraged dow nloading activity - by deleting fiies thatare notfrequently
dow nloaded and by paying m em bers onl
y fordownloading activity - m eans thatHotfile

w as intended to be a distribution network and not merely a storage facility. As a
corollary,the Studios contend that Hotfile's affiliate com pensation structure rewarded
the sharing of Iarger and popJ/ar content, which drove prem ium conversions and
earned revenue forthe network.
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O n the otherhand,Hotfile presents evidence that itconducts its affairs w i
thout

regard to the nature ofthe contentavailable on its system (i.e.,protected by copyrightor

otherwise)oruseractivity (e.g.,storage,sharing,streaming,etc.). Hotfile's exped,Dr.
Boyle,challenges the Studio's claim s about the conversion rate. Even the Studios'
exped,Dr.lan Foster,acknowledges thatentedainm entm edia,which m ay orm ay not

be protected and which Hotfile users m ay orm ay nothave had perm ission to share,can
be a single large file,orSddivided into several,sm allercom puterfiles in orderto facilitate

transm issionorcopying.' (FosterDecl.!!8 (DE 325-17).)
The Studios also pointto specific docum ents to refute Hotfile's claim s thatitdid
notunderstand whatwas occurring on its system . For instance,in an e-m ailbetw een

Hotfile engineers discussing the com pany's intellectual propedy policy, one of them
stated that'dwhatis protecting us Iegally is the factthatwe don'tknow whatis up there
on oursite. Ifwe know ,then we are susceptible to Iawsuits. And now according to the

IP policy,10 days aftera repod,we pretend we don'tknow.'' (Yeh Decl.Ex.54 (DE

288-59 (filed underseall;DE 324-11).) The Studios argue that Hotfile turned a blind
eye to infringement. Moreover,as previously cited,Hotfile acknowledged (oratIeast
expressed the concern) in the Summerof2010 thatitwas becoming d'the flagship of
non-licensed content''and capturing infringing traffic from com peting systems. And as
discussed in the DMCA context below , Hotfile received m illions of notices from

copyright holders claim ing thattheir rights to padicularworks were being infringed yet
failed to targetthe associated users,failed to rem ove otheridenticalcopies ofthe works

from the system (and only removed offending Iinks and notthe offending files),and did
notim plem entrobustcounter-piracy tools untilafterthis lawsuitwas filed.

11
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W ith regard to Hotfile's affiliate program ,the Studios contend that because of
'sfacially pirate''affiliate sites Iike dlcopym ovie.net''- a website that,from screenshots,

apparently displayed popular m ovies' prom otional m aterials and m ay have been
em bedded W ith Hotfile download links - Hotfile should have understood the availability

ofcopyrighted content. (Yeh Decl.Ex.35 (DE 324-3).) ln fact,Hotfile had severalrunins with affiliates regarding piracy. ln one internaldiscussion,forexam ple,an em ployee
nam ed ''Andrei'reached outto Titov aboutan affiliate site called dtplanetsuzy'
'thatwas

''conveding well'' but had som ehow strained its relationship with Hotfile. Titov
responded that ùdit m ust not appear in any way that we pay for advedising on a

pornography site,where piracy activity prospers.'' (Yeh.Decl.Ex.104 (DE 288-116
(filed underseall;DE 324-17).) W hile Hotfile suggests that the docum ent shows its
unwillingness to dealwith infringers,the Studios provide evidence that 'sHotfile m ost

recently paid this affiliate during the period spanning January 16,2012 through January
22,2012 .

suggesting that Hotfile is continuing to m ake paym ents to this website

today.' (FosterDecl.!!56 (DE 286 (filed underseall;DE 325-17).)
The Studios also point to other Hotfile com m unications with affiliates.
Instructions on Hotfile's system addressed to i
ts affiliates stated that third-party site

owners can geta com m ission equalto five percentofaIIprem ium accounts they sell,so

those third-padies should l'lpjost interesting download links''in order to 'earn big
money.'' (Yeh Decl. Ex.57 (DE 324-11) (emphasis addedl.) Otherinstructions to
afiliates suggestuploading l'files only ifyou intenldlto promote them .'' (Yeh Decl.Ex.
59 (DE 324-11).) And,around the tim e of Hotfile's founding,som eone a/iliated with

Hotfile,Andrew lanakov,solici
ted affiliates by posting ona website thatl'lojurgoalis to

12
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reach people w ho are interested in this kind ofbusiness,and to find good uploaders ...
uploading some stuff- m p3,videos,applications,games on our file host and spread
these Iinks over . ..forums where download Iinks are posted (to games,appli
cations

and so on).''(Yeh Decl.Ex.60 (DE 324-12).)
Apad from affiliates,evidence ofsim ilarcom m unications exists between Hotfile

and its uploading and downloading users. One userseeking technicalassistance,for
instance,stated thattlim a prem ium usern im trying to download from the below Iink but
after clicking download button,page not found appears http://ho#iIe.com /dI
/8651708/

cad2aa3/DespicabIe.Me.2010.720p.BRRip.XViD.AC3-FLAW L3SS.pad6rar.htmI.'' (Yeh
Decl.Ex.54 (DE 288-31 (filed underseall;DE 324-11).) Someone atHotfile apparently
responded w ith download instructions. The Studios contend thatthe file name identified
above should have aleded Hotfile to the fact that a user was attem pting to illegally

dow nload a podion of the popularm ovie Despicable M e. Beyond this exam ple,the
evidence show s thatwhenever Hotfile was contacted by users,the title ofthe file Iast
accessed by thatuserwas revealed.

In anotherdocum ent,a Hotfile usercom plained thathe was unable to expod files
thathad been uploaded from Hotfile to otherservices because those services 'i
w rote me

thataIImy files are BLACKLISTED.' (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at719:2-21.(DE

288-3 (filed underseall;DE 324-2).) Someone atHotfile responded that''lslince the
specific value is identicalto a value m arked illegalin oursystem ,uploads are denied.

W e suggest to contact your hoster in this m atter. Unfodunately,due to security and

Iegalmatters,the blockage ofthe value cannotbe Iifted.' (Id.(emphasis addedl.) And
Titov com m ented in an internale-m ailthatdlwe generally do notsuppod transferring files

13
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from ourSystem outand thatis nota problem thatwe need to give m uch consideration.''

(Id.at721:4-10.) ln this regard,Hotfile argues thatthe files were non-transferrable for
reasons independent of copyright'
,they were essentially blank files. But the Studios

rejoin thatthe inference to be drawn is thatHotile had notice thatthe user's fileswere
infringing because they had been blocked by the otherservice.

Sim ilarly,one podion ofHotfile's website allowed users to testw hethera Hotfile
Iink was operational. According to a screen shot, Hotfile provided the instructional

exam ple of t'hdp://hotfile.com //dl/l8zg87/czd67b8/pcD.DollDom ination.zoog.rar.htm l.''

(Yeh Decl. Ex. 44 (DE 324-11).) The Studios contend that the Iink used as an
illustration contained an album by dl-rhe Pussycat Dolls'
'called '
tDolIDom ination''and

thatothercopyrighted works were used in othertutorials illustrating Hotfile's functions.
Hotfile argues thateven ifthe file contained what the Studios assed it contained,this
padicular band authorizes cedain works for online distribution, as one coud has

recognized. See UM G Recordings,Inc.v. Veoh Networks,Inc.,620 F.Supp.2d 1081

(C.D.Cal.2008)(concluding thatthe defendantnetwork did nothave actualknowledge
of infringing m aterialwhere i
t knew thatworks by padicular adists were available for

download since theywere uploaded by adiststhemselves,such asThe PussycatDolls).
D.

AdditionalFacts Relevantto Hotfile's DM CA Defense

As explained m ore fully below,Section 512 ofthe DM CA confers im m unity ''from
aIImonetary relief''on Internetservice providers thatm eetcedain criteria with regard to
storing infringing m aterialand m aking it accessible. Principally, with respect to the

network atissue here,a requirementforeligibility contained in Section 512(i)along with
severalotherrequisites contained in Section 512(c)mandate:thatthe defendanthas a

14
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policy, reasonably im plem ented,for term inating repeat infringers'
,that it is a qualified
service provider'
,that it has properly registered a DMCA agent'
,that it does not have
actualor''red flag''knowledge ofthe infringing nature offiles stored on its system ;thatit

takes down filesthatare the subjectofan infringementnotice'
,thatitdoes notreceive a
direct financial benefit from the alleged infringing activity; that it does not have the
practicalability to controlthe alleged infringem ents;and thatitaccom m odates and does
not interfere with standard technicalm easures used to protect content. Notably,the

statute does notfocus on the generalcharacteristics of the network,does not require
affirm ative action to police content,and does not preclude a grantofim m uni
ty even i
f

the operator knew or should have known of infringem ent generally. The padies'
m otions in this case concern in pad whetherHotfile has m etthose requirem ents and,as

a result,whetherHotfile becam e eligible forsafe harborprotection atany point.
1.

Infringem entNotices and
Hotfile's RepeatInfringerPolicy

Underthe DM CA,lnternetservice providers m ustreasonably im plementa policy
designed to term inate users identified as repeat infringers. To that end, since M ay

2010,Hotfile has provided its users with notice ofa repeatinfringem entpolicy through

the terms ofservice provided on its website. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at279:1-4
(DE 324-2).) That policy states that Hotfile 'ddiscontinuelsl service to users who
repeatedly m ake such contentavailable orotherwise violate HotFile's Term s ofService.
Please do notabuse the HotFile service by using itto distribute materials to which you

do nothave the rights.'' (Titov Decl.j!!r17-19 (DE 321-1).) Priorto thattime,Hotfile

had warned users that l
'Islervices of Hotfile can be used in Iegitimate objectives.
Transm ission, distribution,or storage of any m aterials that violate Iaws is forbidden.
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This includes without restriction patented m aterials, copyright laws, tradem arks,

commercialsecretsand otherintellectualpropedyrights.''(Id.!r12.) lthad also posted

an e-mailaddress on its website - abuse@ hotfile.com - thatthe public could use to
alertHotfile ofinfringem ent. Although the policies essentially ask users notto engage in
m isconduct and warn thatthey m ay be excluded from using Hotfile,they are notably
silentas to whatcriteria Hotfile would considerin term inating repeatinfringers and w hat
effods it would undedake in doing so. It is undisputed that Hotfile term inated only
approxim ately 43 users up to the filing ofthe Com plaint,
It is clear from the record that Hoiile's repeat infringer policy was not tied to
notices ofinfringem entitreceived from copyrightow ners underthe DM CA.Z By the tim e
this Com plaint was filed,for instance,ten m iqlion such notices had been sentto the

company with respectto links to files available on its system. (FosterDecl.% 25 (DE

325-17) (discussing data produced by Hotfilel.) Both sides agree thatthose notices
correspond to approximately eightmillion unique files. (/d.;Titov Decl.!126 (DE 396-

Hotfile acknowledges that it made no connection between infringem ent notices
and acts of infringement. Hotfile explains that it did not track the notices and did not

base its policy on how many notices were associated with cedain users (such as by
''flagging''them). (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at283:24-285:15 (DE 324-2).) Ti
tov

1

The DM CA sets outa notice protocolunderwhich copyrightholders can notify an

agent responsible for the service of claimed infringement. See 17 U.S.C.j
512(c)(3),
'Hendrickson k'
.e8ay,Inc.,165 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1089 (C.D.Cal.
2001). The statute also allows service providers to challenge infringement
designations through a counter-notification process.
16
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said as m uch at his deposition, acknowledging that w hen Hotfile received a DM CA
notice ofinfringem ent,itdid notrecord which useritcorresponded to:

Q.

Priorto the filing ofthis Complaint,when Hotfile received a DM CA notice
from a copyrightowner,did Hotfile attem ptto identify the userwho had
uploaded the offending file?

MR.THOMPSON: Objection,overbroad.
A.

Idon't believe that would be the case m ost of the time. Butagain, on
discretion,em ployees could investigate fudher.

* * *

Q.

....Absenta request,a specific requestby a copyrightowner,priorto the
filing ofthis action,did Hotfile have a practice of identifying the userw ho
had uploaded files identi
fied as infringing on DM CA notices?

MR.THOM PSON: Objection.Overbroad,asked and answered.
Iwon'tsay ''specific request,'but ifa copyrightholderwould raise som e
kind of concern that I- Ithink can be - can be sum marized,again,a
discretion,identification could be m ade.
BY M R.FABRIZIO :
Q.

O kay. My question,though,is without a requestfrom a copyrightowner,
when Hotfile received a DM CA notice,did Hotfile,as a m atterofpractice,
identify the userwho had uploaded the offending file?

MR.THOMPSON:Objection.Asked and answered.
A.

Idon'tbelieve so.

(Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at281:10-282:15 (DE 324-2).) W hile Hotfile did nottrack
such notices,Titov,as the designated corporate Rule 30(b)(6)representative regarding
Hotfile's electronically stored inform ation,testified thatHotfile knows the useridentity for
every upload and thatitwould have been a lstrivialtask'
'to extractuser identities from

infringementnotices. (Yeh Decl.Ex.2 (Titov ESIDep.)at51:23-52:4 (DE 288-4 (filed
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underseall;DE 324-2).) In sum,priorto this action,whethera userwas the subjectof
one notice or300 notices,Hotfile acted no differently in terms ofinvestigating possible
infringem ent.
Instead,in its briefs,Holile credits a system of'smanualreview''and d'discretion''
for the term ination of 43 users. However,the Studios'evidence demonstrates that
Hotfile was m otivated not by policy, but by the threat of Iitigation. Of those 43
term inations,33 were due to a court's tem porary restraining orderissued in connection

wi
th Iitigation initiated by a pornography producercalled 'iLibedy Mediax'' (Yeh.Decl.

Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at299:1-24 (DE 288-2 (filed underseall;DE 324-2).) Others were
apparentlyterm inated when Hotfile orits affiliated entities received Iitigation threats from

copyright holders. (See, e.g., id. at 306:12-307:10 (acknowledging that Hotfile
term inated a user aftera copyrightow nercom plained of Hotfile's failure to respond to

DMCA notices and threatening to hold Hotfile Iiable ford'a huge Ioss to my company''l.)
Thus,w hile Hotfile claim s to have acted to ''term inate,and stop paym ents to accounts of
users with num erous com plaints at content owners' request,'' it has failed t() cite
evidence to suppod the proposition, explain the conditions that led it to target or
term inate users, or rebut the Studios' account of user term ination only by Iitigation.

(See Titov Decl.:134 (stating onl
y that ''Hotfile did review accounts of users with
num erous com plaints atthe request ofcontent owners,did perform m anualreviews of

those accounts,did terminate those accounts,and did stop payments'')(DE 342-2 (filed
underseall;DE 396-1).)
Sim ilarly, Hotfile's public claim s about its repeat infringer policy appear to be
unfounded. Forexam ple,itpurpoded to have a policy ofautom atically rem oving users
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thathad accum ulated two dtstrikes,''based on DM CA notices;the policy was discussed

in internale-mails. (&ee Liebnitz Ex.29 (DE 346-31)atHF02835779 ('$lfuser's files
were repoded tw o tim es as copyright abuse we del
ete useraccount.''lv) Hotfile also
repoded to copyright holders that it acted upon the notices of infringement that it
received, but vetted them m anually to ensure that the users it deleted had in fact

infringed. (/d.) Likewise,internaldocumentssuggestthatHotfile had a ldsystem in place

thatflags the users (with)numerous infringing (Complaintsl'and thatthe corporation
'manually reviewledl those accounts,''deleted them, and seized funds they have

received from theiraffiliate program . (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at28626-18 (DE
288-2 (filed underseall;DE 324-2).)
In his deposition,Titov acknowledged that those representations were untrue.

(See,e.g., Yeh.Decl.Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 286:6-289:4 (DE 324-2).) lndeed, had
Hotfile paid attention to the DM CA notices,itwould have known thatby the tim e ofthe
Com plaint,24,790 users had accum ulated m ore than three notices'
,hal
f of those had
m ore than ten notices'
,half again had 25 notices'
,1,217 had 100 notices'
,and 61 had

more than 300 notices. (FosterDecl.111142-52 & Ex.D.(DE 286 (filed underseall;DE

325-17).) Moreover,documents produced in the Iitigation suppod the conclusiorlthat,
prior to the filing of the Com plaint, Hotfile Iacked any m eaningful policy to com bat

infringement. Although itis the subjectofa motion to strike on the grounds ofhearsay
and authenticity, one docum ent purpods to show a conversation thread in which a

Hotfile userobservesin an online forum thatd
llilfany ofyoulr)filesare repoded bya real
representative (see http://hoiile.com/repodabuse.htm l),then the file willbe deleted,but
your account will not be rem oved,and you willnot be suspended from hotfile.com .''
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(Yeh.Decl.Ex.22 (DE 288-25 (5Ied underseall;DE 324-2).) Similarly,anotheruser
who operated a site w ith Hotfile Iinks, which the Studios suggest was ''blatantly''
infringing, w as suspended but all
egedly had his account restored after contacting

Hotfile.(Yeh.Decl.Ex.100 (DE 288-112 (filed underseall'
,DE 324-16).) The Studios'
expert calculated that this particular user had upl
oaded nearly 30 thousand files to
Hotfile and received

but had also

accumulated9,254takedownnotices.(FosterDecl.:154 (DE 286 (filed underseall;DE
325-17).) To the extent thatthey may be adm issibl
e attrial,these documents give
substance to the Studios'assertions.

Like that user,the evidence produced shows thatthe subjects ofthe notices

formed a discreetgroup ofproblematic users. W hile those who were the subjectof
m ore than three infringem ent notices m ade up Iess than one percentof alIof Hoï le's

users,8 they were responsible forposting 50 million files (15.6 million ofwhich were

subsequently the subject of a takedown notice or removed for infringement),
representing44 percentofaIIfileseveruploadedto Hotfile.(FosterDecl.1141(DE 286
(filed underseall;DE 325-17).) Those same fileswere downloaded nearly 1.5 billion
8

The factthatthese users were few in num berbuthad a Iarge aggregate im pact

(padicularly with respectto downloaded files)accounts forthe discrepancies
between the padies'proffered statistics,as does the factthatthe Studios focus

only on toialdownloading activity. Forinstance,Hotfile argues thatonly four
percent of files ever uploaded have been the subjectofa DMCA notice'
,that

three percent have been rem oved by copyright holders under Hotfile's Special
Rightshol
der Account program '
, that the m ost popular downl
oads are not
copyrighted'
, and that 56 percent of the files uploaded have never been
downl
oaded. Further, because Hotfile m ade significant changes to its system
after this lawsuit w as filed, including im plem enting a three-strikes policy and
various fingerprinting technologies to seek out infringing content, addi
tional
discrepancies are attributable to the tim e period analyzed, Supported by postCom plaint data, Hotfile asseds it has been m ore proactive in identifying and
rem oving infringing files and users.
20
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times,representing roughl
y halfofaIIdownloadseverfrom Hotfile. (/d.)

(1d.) lr1turn,the Conversion rate evidence ShOWS that
Flotfile earned iarge SUI
M S from neW Prem ium tlsers. Significantly,a snapshottaken by

the Studios showed thattheirfiles accounted forone percentofthe files on Hotfil
e,or
945,611 files. W ith regard to dow nloads,however,ten percentoffiles downloaded from

Hotfile (according to the Studios'dcwnload study) were owned or controlled by the
Studios.
W hile Hotfile's efforts to control infringers' activi
ty appears to have been

ineffective (whateverits policy mighthave been),Hotfile adopted a 'revamped repeat
infringer policy'' im m ediately after this Iitigation began. The new policy focuses on
''three strikes'
'- term inating and banning users who receive three DM CA notices of

claimed infringement or Special Rightsholder Account requests (discussed below).

(TitovDecl.!133 (DE 321-1).) Hotfiie now tracks how manytimes itreceives noticesof

infringement,each ofwbich countasa 'strike.''(ld.) Thisrevampedpolicy Ied diredly
to the term ination of444 ofi
ts 500 highest-paid affiliates,although thousands ofsm aller

afiliates were not terminated. (Titov Decl. !( 30 (DE 396-1).) Ul
timately, Hotfile

terminated 22,447 userswithinmonthsofthefiling ofthe Complaint.(TitovDecl.:1134,
37 (DE 342-1 (filed underseall,
'DE 396-1).) Hotfile citesthis evidence in supportofi
ts
argum entthat it is now DM CA com pliant,while the Studios tlse the evidence to show
how ram pant and unchecked user activity had been. And Hotfiie points out that the
num berofusers rem oved is,in relative term s,a sm allnum ber.
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2.

DM CA AgentRegistration

Anotherrequirem entofDM CA protection is thata registered agentbe designated
to receive infringem ent notices. At Ieast as far back as April 24, 2009, Hotfile
maintained an e-m ailaddress posted on its website forthe publicto repod illegitim ate or

illegaluseractivity. Atthattime,the website explained to users thattlltlo exercise your
DM CA rights, your Proper DM CA Notice m ust be sent to Designated Agent of
hotfile.com to em ail: abuse@ hotfi
le.com

.W hen a Proper DMCA notification is

received by Designated Agent,orwhen hotfile.com becom es aware thatcopyrights are
infringed,itwillrem ove ordisable access to infringing m aterials as soon as possible.''

(Titov Decl.11 15 (DE 321-1).) Hotfile formally registered a DMCA agentwith the
CopyrightOffice in December2009,a factthatis undisputed. (Titov Decl.!!16 (DE
321-1).) Thereafter,in May 2010,itposted a policy expressly incorporating the DMCA,
inform ing users of its repeat infringer policy and the contact inform ation for its

designated agent. (Gupta Decl.Ex.6 (W arnerInterrog.Resps.)(DE 275-4 (filed under
seall;DE 320-7).) It is fudherundisputed thatthe agentaddress provided by Hotfile
was a postoffice box,which the Studios contend fails to com ply with the statute.
3.

OtherInfringem entCounterm easures

ln addition to targeting repeat infringers'accounts,Hotfile m akes m uch ofother
counterm easures ithas putinto place,largely afterthis litigation began. Forinstance,
Titov stated thatHotfile's currentpractice is to rem ove individualfiles within 48 hours of

receiving a notice,which he believes Hotfile does 95% ofthe time. (Titov Decl.% 19
(DE 321-1).) The Studios do notdispute thatsince February2011,Hotfile has adhered
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to this practice, although the Studios have subm itted documents suggesting that in
som e instances,Hotfile m ightnothave always done so.

ln August2009,Hotfile implemented a SpecialRightsholderAccount (tdSRA'')

program after receiving a request for a ''takedown tool''from PlaintiffW arner.(Titov
Decl.1120 (DE 321-1).).The program,whichgives rise to Hotfile's counterclaim against
W arner, allows trusted content ow ners w ho attest that they own rights to protected
works to have access to Hotfile's system . This is a m uch quickerajternative than the
user term ination prom pted by a DM cA-com pliant infringem ent notice. Indeed, the
padies have stipulated thatnotifications by the Studios through the SRA program have

the e#ect of notices of infringement for purposes of the DMCA. (DE 151, at 2

(dl
W arner's notifications by means of Hotfile's SRA are (and have the effect of)
notifications ofclaimed infringementto Hotfile's designated agent under 17 U.S.C.j

512(c)(3)(A),and are therefore subjectto 17 U.S.C.j 51249.'').) Through an interface
provided by Hotfile,ow ners are perm itted to identify and autom atically rem ove offending
Iinks w ithout any action by Hotfile. According to record evidence,at Ieast one ofthe

Studios,W arner,has padicipated in this program .
Finally, Hotfile now actively polices files on its network, principally through
advanced filtering technology. Video fingerprinting im plem ented in Septem ber2011 is

capable of identifying copyrighted content,which Hotfile claims to then block. (Ti
tov

Decl.!(35 (DE 321-1).) Hotfile has also used so-called ''hashing techno4ogy''(possibly
since August 20099) to remove identicalcopies of files once one is found '
to be
infringing. This is a revision ofthe Ism asterfile policy''- som ething sharply criticized by
9

w hile Titov stated in his declaration that the technology was im plemented in
August2009,his deposition testim ony is notconsistentwith thatassedion.
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the Studios - in which Hotfile saved server space by maintaining only one copy of
identicalfiles uploaded by different users. Form erly,when Hotfile received a claim of

infringem ent,itdisabled any offending Iinks butdid notactually rem ove the file from the
server,thus Ieaving itaccessible fordow nload with a differentIink. And finally,Hotfile is
em ploying other video and audio fil
tering technology that identifies files with
characteristics m atching content registered by copyright owners, which Hotfile then
blocks. It is unclearw hat im pactthese technologies have had in blocking access to

infringing files thatwere already available at the tim e the Com plaint was filed. But,

according to Hotfile,they have two significant,remedialoutcomes: (1) Hotfile now
rem oves aIIinfringing files to the extent that its sophisticated technology can identi
fy

them ;and (2)the low percentage offiles currentlyidentified and blocked (in the range of
two to four percent in February 2012)demonstrates thatHotfil
e is no longerused to

share infringing files. (See Gupta Decl.Ex.38 (DE 321-39).)
E.

Corporate History and Titov's Involvem ent

The Studios'Iastclaim is againstTitov individually because ofhis padicipation in,
and ability to benefit from , the infringing activi
ty present on Hotfile's network. ln
tov adopted an infringementpadicular, paragraph 45 of the Com plaint states that Ti
reliant business m odel'
,designed the aforementioned affiliate program that promotes
infringem ent and paid infringing users; planned technological features that both

frustrated copyrightenforcementand failed to preventinfringem entby users;m anaged
Hotfile's operations;and operated related businesses to evade liability. W hile Hotfile
m akes m uch of the fact that the Studios have been unable to prove up aIIof these
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allegations, it is m ore significant that severalof them are actually suppoded by the
evidence produced in discovery.

As background,Hotfile is the successorto a business venture

Although itis unclearhow Titov first becam e involved w i
th

orw hat

exactly the com pany was form ed to do.itis undisputed that Ti
tov pe/orm ed software
program ing,search engine optim ization and serveradm inistration forthe com pany. At
som e point,

devised the idea for an online file hosting com pany based on a

com petitor in the m arket, Rapidshare. Thus,

provided the

necessary stad-up capi
tal for Hotfile Corp. Titov was approached because of his

technicalexpedise andpriorweb-hostingexperience'
,hejoinedthem infounding Hottile
in Fall2008. Hotfile acknowledges thatthe

''researched the com petition in this

space to learn about the functionalities of other services'' and agreed on Holile's
business m odel. They then staffed the com pany alm ost entirely with

employees,who continue to work forHotfii
e. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at105:5-7

(DE 288-1(filedunderseall'
,DE 324-2).)
The evidence shows thatTitov's prim ary roje atHotfile is as a technicalengineer,

responsible for im pjem enting business ideas and functions. For instance,the padies

agree thatTitov wrote the source code thatruns Hotfile's websi
te. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1

(Titov Dep.)at497:3-7 (DE 288-2 (filed underseall;DE 324-2)(acknowledgingwriting
between 50 and 70 percentofthe source codel'
,Yeh Decl.Ex,88 (Titov DecI.)at!(6

(DE 288-95 (fijed underseall;DE 324-15)(.
'1wrotethe source codeforHotfile'swebsite
w ith the assistance of one other person. W e designed the source code from scratch.
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M y conservative estim ate is that m ore than 1,000 hours have been spent developing

the source code.'').) Titov also provides 'd
guidancen to

employees and

overseesaspectsoftheirworkforHotfile.(Jd.at132:8-20 OI'm notsurethatIdoinfact
supervise them but ...to the extentthey need som e guidance and understanding ofthe
technicalparts of...oursystem ,yes we do comm unicate,and - yes,Iw ould say thatI

have certainauthorityoverthem.').)
The evidence dem onstrates thatTitov activel
y parti
cipates in the m anagem entof
Hotfile and in decision-m aking.

Titov testified that Hotfile'

shareholders manage

Hoïle jointlyand,whilethe governance procedures have notal
waysbeenformal,they

agree on majordecisions such as the implementation of Hotfile's amliate program.
(Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Fitov Dep.)at597:11-598:22 (DE 324)(stating thati'majorissues''
were putto a vote butwere notopposedl.) Additionally,Titov acknowledged thathe
recei
ved power of attorney to act on behalf of the corporation ''as a m anager of the

com pany when gsuch)acts are authorized by othershareholders.'' (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1

(TitovDep.)at79.
.23-80:1.
,82:5-12 (DE288-1(filed underseall;DE 324-2).)
Nonetheless, i
t is undisputed that Titov does not have the authority to m ake

unilateral decisions regarding im portant aspects of Hothl
e's business or operations.
Titov asserts thathe was notthe originatorofcertain concepts;forinstance,he credits
w ith m aking the decision to im plem entthe affiliate program . And Titov denies
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involvem ent in other aspects crucial to Hotfile's business, such as soliciting new
investors,selecting contractors ordevising advertising strategi
es.
The evidence also shows that,in O ctober2009,Titov form ed a com pany called
Lem uria Com m unications Inc.ja Florida corporati
on that Hotfile uses to perform web

hosting.software m aintenance and developm ent. Titov,according to the Defendants,is
''
the sole ow ner,m anager,and director''of Lem uria.'o Lem uria, in turn,contracts with

to perform som e ofthose services and pays for m any of Hotfile's expenses.

(Yeh.Decl,Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at38:7-40:10,106:2-107:14 (DE 288-1 (filed underseall'
,
DE 324-2),)
Beyond exam ining Titov's overallresponsibilities at Hotfile,the Studios point to
severalspecific w ays that Titov is Iinked to the infringem entat issue. W ith respect to
the affiliate program ,which the Studios believe promotes infringem ent,itis undisputed
that Ti
tov provided input on technologicalfeasibility. M oreover, Hotfile has failed to

rebutthe Studios'issèrtions thatTitov paid affiliates from an accounthe opened and
transferred to Hotfile Ltd.,a com pany thathandles m ostofHotfile's finances and thatI
ne

manages. (Titov Repiy Decl.!!4 (DE 378-1 (filed underseall;Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov
Dep.)at602:9-14 (DE 324-2)(?Yes,there were instandes where users were paid by an

accountopened (in)myname.'').) Titovajsostatèdthathewasawareofthemasterfile
policy,acknow ledging thatitperm itted users to continue to access suspected files even

10

Lem uria was form ed one m onth afterHotfile's previous lnternet servioe provider
inform ed the com pany that it had received a large num ber of infringem ent
com plaints from copyright holders and two m onths after a copyright holder

served a subpoena on thatlnternetservice provider. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov
Dep.) at 119:13-121(DE 288-2 (fil
ed under seall; DE 324-2).) The Studios
contend that Lem uria was form ed to prevent the consequences ofa third-party
Internet service providercutting offHotfile's service and that Lem uri
a acts as a
frontforHotfile's com m ercialactivity, Hotfile denies these aliegations.
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while individuallinks were disabled. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at602:16-604:13
(DE 324-2).) Similarly,given thatHotfile was governed jointly,Ti
tov did not recall
opposing Hotfile's key policies, such as how it treated repeat infringers or how it

endeavored to rem ove infringing files.
Finally,while evidence ofTitov's personalinvolvem ent in Hotfile's treatm ent of

copyright infringem ent claim s is not extensive, he acknow ledged instructing Hotfile

employees to ban a userand to $
'(b)e more strictin stopping these days,''afterHotfile

was sued by a company called Perfect 10. (Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Titov Dep.)at317:15321:10 (DE 288-2 (filed underseall;DE 324-2).) Titov was also responsible forhiring
Hotfile's DM CA agent,but he claim s that others are responsible for responding to

DM CA notices and handling thataspectofHoiile's operation.
F.

Facts Relevantto Hotfile's Counterclaim

Separately,W arnermoves forsummary judgmenton a l7-page counterclaim
filed by Hotfile relating to 890 DM CA takedow n notices thatW arnersubm itted to Hotfile.

(DE 161-4.) In these notices,W arnertypicall
y stated 'underpenalty ofperjury''thatit
was ''the ow nerorauthorized Iegalrepresentative ofthe ownerofcopyrights''and thatit

had $'a good faith belief that use of this m aterial is not authorized by the copyright
ow ner, the copyright ow ner's agent, or the Iaw.'' Since April 2009, W arner has
padicipated in Hotfile's SRA program ,in which the padies agree thatdeletions have the
sam e legaleffectas takedown notices.

The counterclaim asseds thatthe works at issue were m istakenly identified as

infringing and thatW arnerviolated 17 U.S.C.j 51249 by making such knowing and
materialm isrepresentations and causing injury to Hotfile. W arnercontends that,while
28
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m istakes were m ade,they w ere notm ade knowingly and are notthe type ofegregious
violations contem plated by the statute'
,thatthere were few resulting dam ages to Hotfile;

and that Hotfile's m otive in pursuing the claim is to dem onstrate how difficult i
t can be
foranyone to identify and preventinfringement,which helps Hotfile illustrate i
ts defense
to the m ain infringem entclaims.
W arner's Review Process

Many of Hotfile's contentions concern the sufficiency of the review process
W arner im plem ented to identi
fy and notice particularfiles. As explained by W arner's

head of anti-piracy operations, David Kaplan, W arner devotes the effods of
em ployees to online anti-piracy enforcem ent, hires third-pady vendors,and, notably,

ln the autom ated review process,W arner's em ployees firstdeterm ine that a sîte

is used forInternetpiracy. (Kaplan Decl,!16 (DE 301-6).)

(ld.!(8.)
29

Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 30 of 99

Foreach Iink
determ ined to contain infringing content,W arnersends infringem entnotices.
2.

Prevalence and Know ledge of Errors

O verall,while the evidence shows thatW arner's system has m any com m endable
characteristics, i
t also reveals som e areas for im provem ent. On one hand,W arner

applies the system onl
y to si
tes i
t believes to be devoted to infringing content,takes
care in

uses em ployees to tailor search term s,
1 reviews its

practices on a continuous basis, conducts spot checks,

'

(Kaplan Decl.111115-16 (DE 301-6).)
W arner contends that it '
lhas designed its system to err on the si
de of consew atism ,

even ifthatresults in fewerinfringing files being identifiedvin orderto avoid errorsy''and

professes great confidence in the reliability of its enforcement. (Id. !( 6.) lt also
repeatedly asseds thatits methodology and system features are com m on in its industry.

On the otherhand,W arnerreadily adm its thatm istakes do occur,and Hotfile has
identised characteristics that m ay be responsible forengendering those m istakes. For
exam ple,W arner's staffdid notdow nload orreview any Hotfile contentbefore marking it
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for removal. (Thompson Decl,Ex.4 (Kaplan Dep.)at43:12-44:14 (DE 354-5).)11
Indeed,its search process

before issuing a takedown notice.
determ ination whetherthere were legaluses
forthe files.

The parties have proffered Iim i
ted statisticaland anecdotalevidence abouthow
this translates to the effectiveness ofW arner's system . Forits part,W arneravers that i
t

sent 400,000 takedown notices to Hotfile prior to this Iawsuit w i
thout receiving any
counternotices from Hotfile orits users,suggesting thatthe m istakes were notapparent

orsignifi
cantenough to contest. (See Kaplan Decl.:114 (DE 301-6).) Moreover,
according to W arner,the fact that only 89O erroneous files have been identified by

Hotile after it undertook the m ost scrupulous review of those takedown notices
suggests a Iow errorrate,wellunderone percent,by a sim pl
e calculation.

W arnergoes fudher,suggesting thatthe actualnum berofm istaken notices sent

to Hotfile num bers around 600,not890. Show ing the difficulty attendantto identifying
infringing content,the evidence shows that 19 ofthe files challenged by Hotfile in tbe

counterclaim are in factow ned by W arner. Another271 ofthe files undisputedly belong
to an enti
ty,Electronic Ads,Inc.,thatgave W arnerperm ission - albeit, apparently after-

the-fact-to requestremovalofthefiles.(SeeHopkinsDecl.$9(DE 301-7)(Electronic
11

W arnercontends thati
tw ould nothave been 'practicable forW arnerto dow nload
files prior to issuing a notification of infringem ent' because of the com puting

resources required. (Kaplan Decl.!J17 (DE 301-6).) Additionally,some ofthe

5l
es in the counterclaim were reviewed by a W arnervendorcalled LeaklD ! w hich
.

(/d.$20.)
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Arts, lnc. executi
ve stating that the com pany Kretroactively authorizes W am er having

senttakedown notices''on its behalg.) And itis also undisputed thatofthe 890 files
Iisted,24 are duplicative. This fudhersuppods the view thatW arner's actualerrorrate,
in generaland w ith respectto its search ofHotfile's websi
te in particular,is sm all.

In response,Hotfile points to otherevi
dence thatW arner's errorrate m ay actually
be higher,the m ostim podant being an internaldiscussion between W arnerem ployees
in August2011.

Thus, drawing
inferences in favorofHotfile,W arnerem ployees m ighthave know n of an erroirate as
high a

during the tim e that it was identifying the fiies identi
fied in the

counterclaim .

Hotfile also points to instances of anecdotal errors to show how unsound

W arner's search practices m ight have been. For exam ple,

(Thompson Decl.Ex.4 (Kaplan Dep.)

at16:10-17:4 (DE 354-5).) W arneralso apparently

(Thompson Decl.EX.5 (DE 304-1t5led under
32
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seall;DE 354-6).) A searchforth
(Thompson Decl.Ex.16

(DE 304-6 (filed underseal);DE 354-17).) And

(Thompson Decl.Ex.18(DE 304-6(filedunderseall;DE 354-19).)
M oreover,W arner adm its thaton Iinking sites,it

(Thompson Decl.Ex.4 (Kaplan Dep,)at
232:23-233:7 (DE 304-1 (filed underseall;DE 354-5).) Thus,itdeleted one ofthe
counterclaim fil
es because it

Hotfile claim s that en m asse deletion was W arner's typical
practice and extends beyond this exam ple.

In addition,Hotfile has also proffered evidence of an illicit m otive on W al-ner's
part. Forexam ple,W arner liberally rem oved what is by aIIindications a popuiaraI
3d
innocuous free softw are program m entioned atthe outsetofthis decision,JDownioader,
w hich was created by a com pany called 'Appwork G m bH'
'and w hich W arnerdoes not

ow n or have rights to. ln one instance, W arner targeted the program because it

(Thompson Decl.Ex,4 (KaplanDep.)at225:13-226:12 (DE 304-1(filed
underseall;DE 354-5).)
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W arner's efforts to police were at tim es overzealous and overreaching. ln the

case of JDownloader, its anti-piracy executive stated that

As discussed
above,W arner took Iiberties in rem oving content owned by Other copyright holders,
SUCh as Electronic Ads, only obtaining perm ission to do so later in an ''antipiracy

partnership.'' ln the main summaryjudgmentbriefing,the Studios show thatthe most
popular content on Hotfile is actuall
y software thatis illegalto distribute butthat does

nOt include the Studios'works. A nd, in its m otion,W arner points out that Hotfile is

unable to recoverforthe vastmajorityofthe filesW arnerwrongfully removed. These
facts dem onstrate that W arner's goals m ay have been broader than preventing

infringementofits own works in the mannerprescribed bySection 512(c).
Evidence of Dam ages

Assum ing W arner's actions were unauthorized,W arner contends that Hotfile is

unable to show a cogni
zable injury from the takedown notices identified in the
counterclaim . First,W arnerhas established thatmany ofthe files did notcause Hotfile

to wrongfully term inate any paying users. At least28 ofthe files were noticed before
Hotfile im plemented a repeatinfringerpolicy based on strikes,m eaning thatHotfile took
no action w hen it received those notices. Sim ilarly,nine fiies wrongfully noticed after
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Hotfile im plem ented its three-strikes policy in February 2011 did not result in user
term ination,since those useo neveraccum ulated m ore than three strikes. Additionally,

53 files were posted by users w ho woui
d have accum ulated three or m ore strikes
w ithout counting the fipes from the counterclaim , although Hoiile questions whether
som e of those notifications were DM cA-com pliant. And finally, nine rem aining files
correspond to six users,none ofwhom was a subscribing mem ber. These facts are not

otherwisesubjecttodispute.
W arnerhas also retained an expert,Dr.Zebrak,who concluded that477 ofthe

files - i
f they did not belong to W arner- 'highly Iikely''infringed others'copyrights and
had no business being on Hotfile's system . This portion of Dr.Zebrak's testim ony is

challenged by Hotfile,which points outthatthe expertacknowledged he did notcontact

those owners to find outwhetherdistribution on Hotfile was truly unauthorized. (Zebrak
Decl.li16 (DE 201-1)*
,Thompson Decl.Ex.32 (ZebrakDep.)at319:3-22 (DE 354-33).)
Itis well-established thata lack ofauthorization is reguired to prove a claim ofcopyright

infringement. See Morley Music Co.v.Cafe Conth lnc.,777 F.Supp.1579,1582 (S.D.

Fla.1991)(citations omitted). There is no compelling evidence one wayorthe other
establishing these files'copyrightstatus.

ButHotfile'
s m ain assedion is thatW arner's focus w rongly assum es that Hotfile's

Iost revenue could onl
y have com e from term inated users'subscription fees. Instead,
Hotfile points outthatits business m odelis driven by the availability ofcontent,w hiah

W arner's actions have interfered with. Hotfile has provided evidence thatthe files inthe
counterclaim , even excluding the files identi
fied as infringing by Dr. Zebrak, were
dow nloaded 278,319 tim es and earned Hotfile
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new useraccounts. (Ti
tovDecl.15 7-8 (DE 304-10 (filed underseall;DE 352-1).) The
JDownloader program in particular was deleted eight tim es by W arner,but had been

downloaded a totalof150,028 tim es and resulted in 42 prem ium subscriptions,earning

forHotfile. (TitovDecl.IIT 7-8 (DE 304-10 (5Ied underseall;DE 352-1).) And,
W arner's ow n exped acknowledged that the false notices caused one JDownloader
distributorto be briefly suspended,apparently preventing dow nloads ofhis files fortwo

days. Iti
s unclearwhetherthefilesdeletedwere everreplaced. (FosterReply Decl.f!3

(DE 360-1(filed underseall;DE409-9).)
Hofile's exped, Dr, Matthew R, Lynde,estim ates that Hoiile's totaldam ages

rangefrom

.(Thompson Decl.Ex.34 (Lynde DecI.)at% 9(DE 304-7

(filed underseall;DE 354-35)'
,Yeh.Decl.Ex.1 (Lynde Dep.)at282:5-25(DE 301-10).)
He opines on a variety of w ays in which Hotfile could have been harmed, including

dim inishing paym ents to affiliates, decreasing incentive for users to pay for prem iblm
access,and harm to Hotfile's business reputation and goodwill. His opinion associatas
an observed decrease in revenue w ith increased use oftakedow ns by W arner.
II.

DISCUSSIO N

The parties have moved forsummaryjudgmenton various aspects ofthe claims
and defenses raised in this Iitigation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,

summ ary judgment i
s appropriate if, after di
scovery, 'the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories,asidavits and adm issions on file,togetherwith the affidavits,

show thatthere is no genuine issue as to any m aterialfactand thatthe m oving party is

entitled to ajudgmentas amatterofIaw.'' Celotex Corp.v.Catrelt 477 U.S.317,322
(1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(c)). ''A n issue of fact is 'm aterial'if, under the
36
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applicable substantive law,itm ightaffectthe outcome ofthe case.'' Hickson Corp.v.N.

Crossarm Co.,lnc.,357 F.3d 1256,1259-60 (11th Cir.2004)(citations omitted). ''An
issue offactis 'genuine'ifthe record taken as a whole could Iead a rationaltrieroffact

to find forthe nonmoving pady.' Id.at 1260 (citations om itted). S'The moving pady
bears the initialburden ofestablishing the nonexistence ofa triable fact issue.'' Cont'
l

Cas.Co.ktW endt,2O5 F.3d 1258,1261(11thCir.2000)(citing Ce/olex Corp.,477 U.S.

at317). ln ruling on summary judgment,the evidence and reasonable inferences are
construed in the lightm ostfavorable to the non-m ovant. Adickes g.S.H.Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970),
'Jackson v.Bellsouth Telecomms.,372 F,3d 1250,1280
(11th Cir.2004).
lf the m ovant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of m aterialfact,the
nonm oving pady m ust ''go beyond the pleadings and by her ow n affidavits or by the
ldepositions,answers to interrogatories,and adm issions on file'designate 'specific facts

showing thatthere is a genuine issue fortrialv'' Ce/olex,477 U.S.at324 (quoting Fed.

R.Civ.P.56(c)). Thus,''liqfthe non-movant...failsto adduce evidence which would

be sufficient...to suppod ajuryfinding forthe non-movant,summaryjudgmentmay be
granted.'' Brooks v.Blue Cross & Blue Shield ofFIa.,Inc.,116 F.3d 1364,1370 (11th
Cir.1997)(citation omitted). However,''iffactualissues are present,the Coud must
deny the m otion and proceed to triala'' W arrior Tombigbee Transp. Co.v. MN Nan

Fung,695 F.2d 1294,1296 (11th Cir.1983)(ci
tations omitted).
A.

DM CA Defense

The padies agree thatthe properstading pointforthe Coud's analysis is whether
Hotfile is entitled to DM CA protection,given its ability to absolve Hotfile of Iiability for
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secondary copyrightinfringement. See 17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(1)(stating thati
fthe safe
harborrequirements are met,''Ea)service providershallnotbe Iiable formonetary relief,

or,except as provided in subsection (),for injunctive or other equitable relief,for
infringementofcopyrightby reason ofthe storage atthe direction ofa userofm aterial
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service

provider.''l'
,S.Rep.No.105-190 (1998)at64,reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N.at639
(stating thatthe safe harbor''protectls)qualifying service providers from liability forall

monetary relieffordirect,vicarious and contributory infringement''as wellas injunctive
relieg. As recounted in detailin Viacom,Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to
provide Iiability safe harbors for service providers that operate or control networks
through which users store copyrighted digitalworks if those providers m eet cedain

specified criteria. 676 F.3d at 26-27 (citing 17 U.S.C.j 512(a)-(d) and Iegislative
history). The Studios contend thatHotfile is notenti
tled to safe harborprotection as a
m atter of law ,w hile Hotfile asks for a determ ination that it is not Iiable for acts of

infringem entthattook place afterthe filing ofthe Com plainton February 18,2011.
Generally,the advances of the lnternet and digitaltechnology m ake possible
replication and dissem ination of creative works on an astonishing scale. S.Rep.No.

105-190 (1998) at 8 (noting ds
the ease with which digi
talworks can be copied and

distributed worldwide vidually instantaneously''). In thatregard,the DMCA was meant
to fosterthe grow th ofthe Internetw hile protecting the rights of copyright holders and
encouraging Internet entities' effods to offer valuable on-line services, which on
occasion m ightbe infringing undercopyrightlaw . Id.;Realnetworks,Inc.B.D VD Copy

ControlAss'
n,641 F. Supp.2d 913,943 (N.D.Cal.2003) ('tThe DMCA represents
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Congress'attem ptata balance to preserve ownership rights protection forcom panies
and adists in the face of the m odern reality of a digitalworid with an increasingly

technologically-savvy population.''). As Hotfile recognized atoralargument,withoutthe
im m unity conferred by the DM CA safe harbor provisions, Internet businesses could

otherwise be subjectto ruinous Iiability under common Iaw principles of secondary
infringem ent.

A pady asseding DM CA'S safe harbor as an affirm ative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement has the burden ofdem onstrating entitlem entto its protections.

See ALS Scan,Inc.v.Remaro Communities.,Inc.,239 F.3d 619,625 (4th Cir.2001)
(stating thatentitlementto immunity underthe DMCA isnot''presumptive''butappliesto

service providers thatprove they meetcedain criterial;see a/so Blue Cross & Blue

Shield ofAla.v.W eitz,913 F.2d 1544,1552 (11th Cir.1990) (discussing burden of
proofasto a statute ofIimitationsdefense).Nonetheless,inmany instances,the DMCA
serves to relieve service providers of burdens they m ight otherwise shoulder,even
transferring them to the copyright owner. See, e.g., UM G Records, Inc.

Shelter

CapitalPartners LLC,718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.2013) ('congress made a considered
policydetermination thatthe 'DMCA notification procedures (would)place the burden of
policing copyright infringement - identifying the potentially infringing m aterial and
adequately documenting infringem ent - squarely on the owners of the copyright.'''

(quoting Perfect10,Inc.v.CCBiIILLC,488 F.3d 1102,1113 (9th Cir.2007))). In this
regard,couds have counseled that the advantages of the DM CA should be viewed

capaciously. See Flava W orks v.Gunter,689 F.3d 754,758 (7th Cir.2012). Although
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an affirm ative defense, the DM CA has often been construed in favor of service
providers,requiring relatively Iittle effortby theiroperations to m aintain imm unity.

Hotfile asseds that it qualifies for DM CA protection as an Internet service
provider that allows inform ation to reside on its system at the direction of its users,

which is one of four speci
fied categories recognized by the Act. See 17 U.S.C.j

512(c)(1).The padies do notdispute thatHotfile qualifiesas a service provider. Seeid.
j 512(k)(1)(A) (defining a t'service provider' as ''an entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online com m unications, between or
am ong points specified by a user, of m aterial of the user's choosing, w ithout

modification to the contentofthe materialassentorreceived.'').The term ''storage''has
also been broadly interpreted to include displaying or dissem inating content that is
uploaded to the system 's servers at the direction of users, w hich covers Hotfile's

operations. See UM G Recordings, Inc.,62O

Supp.2d at 1089-91 (construing

statutory Ianguage and concluding that Congress intended a broad application by
including the phrase l
dby reason of,'such thatthe protected infringing conductneed not

be limited to an actofstorage).
Section 512 provides thata prelim inary condition foreligibility is thatthe service

provider maintain a policy to terminate ddrepeat infringers.'' 17 U.S.C.j 512(i)(1)(A).
The padicularcategory ofservice providerthatapplies to Hotfile im poses fouraddi
tional
requirem ents'
.

ted States
the service provider designates an agent to the Uni

Copyright Office and to the public through its service'
, (2) the service provi
der acts
expeditiously to l'rem ove,ordisable access to''infringing m aterialitactually knows ofor
of which it should be aware from 'facts or circum stances''showing that 'infringing
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activity is apparenti''(3)the providerhas no actualorred flag knowledge ofinfringing
activity;and (4)the providerreceives no financialbenefitfrom infringing activity. ld.j
512(c)(1).W hile case law has developed in otherpads ofthe country,construing these
provisions is an issue offirstim pression in this Circuit.
1.

RepeatInfringerPolicy

The repeatinfringerrequirementofSection 512(i)calls fora policy,reasonably
im plem ented, that provides for the term ination of a service provider's users in
dsappropriate circumstances'''

The Iim itations on Iiability established by this section shall apply to a
service provider only if the service provider . . has adopted and
reasonably im plem ented,and inform s subscribers and accountholders of
the service provider's system ornetwork of,a policy that provides forthe
term ination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat
infringers.

17 U.S.C.j 512(i)(1)(A). Congress,in enacting the DMCA,failed to elaborate upon
w hatitm eans fora policy to be reasonably im plem ented.See Perfect10,Inc.v.ç)CBiII,

LLC,488 F.3d 1102,1109 (9th Cir.2007). Thus,in the absence ofexpress statutory
Ianguage,the Ninth Circuit has prescribed that d'an im plem entation is reasonable if,
under 'appropriate circum stances,' the service provider term inates users who

repeatedly orblatantly infringe copyright''- a standard thatthis Coud applies. CCBiII,

LLC,488 F.3d at11O9 (quoting Iegislative history).
Sucha policy may take a variety offorms. Id. Notably,$'j 512(i)does notrequire
a service provider to decide, ex ante, the specific types of conduct that will m erit
restricting access to its services.'' Corbis Corp.B.Am azon.com ,Inc.,351 F.Supp.2d

1090,1101-02 (W .D.W ash.2004),rev'
d in parlon othergrounds,Cosmetic Ideas,Inc.
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Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 42 of 99

B,IAc/lnterativecorp.,606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir.2010).Forstorage Iockers Iike Hotfile,the
focus of the analysis is on uploading users: ''users w ho know they Iack authorization
and nevedheless upload contentto the Internetforthe world to experience orcopy .

are blatant infringers that Internet service providers are obligated to ban from their

websites.''CapitolRecords,Inc.B.Mp3tunes,LLC,821 F.Supp.2d 627,637 (S.D.N.Y.

2011).
In assessing the reasonableness ofa defendant's effods,additionalguidance on
whatconstitutes an appropriate policy can be ascedained in the Act's Iegislative history.
For instance,policies should be considered in Iightof Congress's intention that ls
those

who repeatedly orflagrantly abuse theiraccess to the Internetthrough disrespectforthe
intellectualproperty rights ofothers should know thatthere is a realistic threatoflosing
that access.'' UM G Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks; Inc.,665 F.Supp.2d 1099,

1118 (C.D.Cal.2009)(quoting legislative history). Service providers granting access to
those users should also be given d'strong incentives ...to preventtheirservices from
becom ing safe havens or conduits forknown repeatcopyright infringersx' Pelfect 10,

Inc.v'
.Cybernet Ventures,Inc.,213 F.Supp.2d 1146,1178 (C.D.Cal.2002). Yet
consonantwith otherprovisions ofthe DM CA,couds should notconstrue policies so as
to im pose alirm ative action on the pad of the service provider to m onitor for

infringement. See 17 U.S.C.j 512(m),
'CybernetVenturest lnc.,213 F.Supp.2d at

1176 (interpreting legislative history).As Congress stated:
The Com m ittee recognizes that there are different degrees of on-line
copyright infringem ent,from the inadvedent and noncom m ercial, to the
willfuland com m ercial. In addition,the Com m ittee does not intend this

provision to undermine the principles of new subsection ((m)) or the
knowledge standard ofnew subsection (c)by suggesting thata provider
m ust investigate possible infringements, m onitor its service, or m ake
42
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dimcultjudgments as to whetherconductis oris notinfringing. However,
those who repeatedly or flagrantl
y abuse their access to the Internet
through disrespect for the intellectual propedy rights of others should
know thatthere is a realistic threatofIosing thataccess.

H.R.Rep.No.105-551(11)at61 (1998)(em phasisadded).
The Studios in this action do notcontend that Hotfile failed to dictate or publish
any policy, but rather that Hotfile failed to reasonably im plem ent it by actually

term inating users. Severalconsiderations,taken together, Iead the Coud to agree.
Initially, a reasonable policy m ust be capable of tracking infringers. Reviewing the

holdings of Ellison tt Robertson,357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.2004) and In re Aimster
CopyrightLitigation,334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir.2003),cerl.denied,540 U.S.1107 (2004),
the coud in CCBiIIannounced a standard forSection 512(i)in which a service provider
m ust m aintain a vehicle to receive notices ofpotentialinfringem ent,design its system
so as to be able to ascedain the identity ofthe users responsible forthose files,and
m ake som e effod to record infringing users

.

488 F.3d at 1110.12 W ithout those

threshold functions,service providers are unable to carry out any sod of reasonable

policy. Forinstance,in In re AimsterCopyrightLitigation,252 F.Supp.2d 634 (N D.111.

2002),the district coud concluded thatwhatever policy the defendants might have
ostensibly had could notbe reasonably implemented because the system 's encryption
12

This is differentfrom a situation where a plaintiffclaim s that a service provider
m ustIook forrepeat infringers w ho open accounts undernew pseudonyms. CL
Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1144-45

(distinguishing A&M Records,Inc.v'
.NapsterjInc.,No.C99-05183 MHP,2000
W L 573136 (N.D.Cal.May 12,2000),which found thatfailure to block users'
Internet Protocol addresses created a question w hether the policy was

reasonable). In CCBiII,there was no dispute thatthe defendantimplemented a
policy by which itkepta DM CA Iog indicating the nam e and e-m ailaddress ofthe
webm asterforeach site to which itprovided service.
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ofuserinform ation m ade it''im possible to ascedain which users are transferring which
files.'' Id.at659. The coud ruled thatthe precondition to safe harborwas notm eteven
though the plaintiffs had failed to identify 1
'a single repeatinfringerw hose access should
be term inated.'' Id.
In this case,w hile the statute does notrequire Hotfile to m aintain a perfectpolicy

(oreven anything as stringentas the three-strikes policy iteventuall
y implemented),itis
apparent that Hotfile effectively did nothing to tie notices to repeat infringers. Titov

adm itted,and Hotfile does not seriously dispute,that the corporation had no way to
keep track of infringing users based on infringement notices. Hotfile's sole m ethod for
term inating its users was its d
'discretion,'w hich itevidently failed to exercise'
,it had no

technology to record notices and no procedure for dealing w ith notification.
Consequently,itis nottoo harsh an assessmentto conclude thatwhen Hotfile received
such notices,it was Hotfile's practice to ignore them ratherthan actto term inate the

users they were associated with.This deliberate disregard is significant.
The data discussed above - both the num ber of users who received m ultiple

notices of infringement and the num ber of users who were term inated after Hotfile
im plem ented a stronger policy - show that Hotfile failed to act when confronted with
infringing conduct.13 Thus, despite receiving overeight m illion notices for five m illion
users, Hotfile only term inated 43 users before the com m encem ent of this action,for
reasons that had no apparent relation to the notices Hotfile received. M ostglaringly,
there were 61 users who had accum ulated m ore than 300 notices each. As recounted

13

Hotfile claimsthatit''had no knowledge thatthe filelsl-in-suitwere infringing aparf
from notifications Hotfile (m ight)have received from the Studios regarding these
alleged infringements.''(TitovDecl.!16.(DE 321-1)(emphasis addedl.)
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above,those users were padicularly prolific,driving traffic to Hotfile's website,receiving
m oney through Hotfile's affiliate program ,and generating significantrevenue forHotfile
by encouraging users to conved to prem ium subscriptions,
In response,Hotfile contends thatthe DM CA does notm andate action based on
infringem ent notices. On this point,there is some disagreement as to w hether such
notices equate to know ledge ofa user's actualinfringem entvl4 See, genera//y,4-128 M ;

Nim mer& Nimmer,Copyrightj 12B.1O(B)(Matthew BenderRev.Ed.2013). The coud
in Corbis Corp.,for instance,found thatDMCA notices alone are notenough to confer

knowledge on a service provider: ''
A lthough there m ay be instances in which two or
more DM CA com pliantnotices m ake a service provideraw are ofa user's blatant,repeat
infringem ent, the notices alone do not m ake the user's activity blatant, or even
conclusively determ ine thatthe useris an infringer.''351 F.Supp.2d at 1105 & n.9;see

also M p3tunes,LLC,821 F.Supp.2d at637.
Yet a subsequent circuitcoud decision in CCBiIIsuggests a different approach
on this issue

.

That coud held that statutorily deficient notices of infringem ent - in

padicular,those lacking a declaration from the copyrightholderdetailing ownership and
the m aterial's infringing nature - were an insufficient basis for term inating a user.
CCBiII,488 F.3d at1113. Atthe sam e tim e,however,itheld thatthe districtcoud erred

in failing to considerw hetherdefendants'continued services forwebsites thatwere the

subject of non-pady noti
fications (which might have conformed wi
th the statute)

14

couds agree thatSection 512(i)requires term inating known repeat infringers.
See CC Bill,488 F.3d at 1113 ('A policy is unreasonable only if the service
providerfailed to respond when ithad knowledge ofthe infringement.''l;Ellison,
357 F.3d at1080.
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constituted an unreasonable policy. Id. Thus, the decision suggests that proper

notifications,which require '(a!statementthatthe complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the m aterialin the m anner com plained of is not authorized by the

copyrightowner,itsagent,orthe Iaw,''17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(3)(A)(v),can provide requisite
know ledge to defendants. Other decisions support this reasoning. See UM G

Recordings,Inc.,665 F.Supp.2d at1116-18 (holding thatfiltering technology used by
the defendant to identi
fy infringing m aterial did not constitute knowledge because,

l
dhoweverbeneficialthe (filtering)technology is in helping to identify infringing material,it

does notmeetthe standard ofreliability and verifiability required by(CC Billjin orderto
justify terminating a user's accountnl;Flava W orks,Inc.v.Gunfer,No.10C6517,2011
W L 3205399,at*10 (N.D.111.July 27,2011),rev'd on othergrounds,689 F.3d 754 (7th
Cir.2012) (d'It is true thatservice providers are not required to police their sites for
infringem ent,butthey are required to investigate and respond to notices ofinfringem ent
-

with respect to content and repeatinfringers.'). As one coud observed,CC Bill

borrowed the knowledge standard from Section 512(c)(1)(A),which requires removalof
m aterialupon noti
fication ofclaim ed infringement. UM G Recordings,665 F.Supp.2d

at1117.
,see also Corbis Corp.,351 F.Supp.2d at11O7 ('(T)he mostpoweKulevidence

ofa service provider's knowledge (isan)actualnotice ofinfringementfrom the copyright
holder.''l;cfkUMG Recordings,Inc.,2013 W L 1092793,at*10 (stating thatthe plaintiff's
''decision to forgo the DM CA notice protocolstripped itofthe m ostpowerfulevidence of

a service provider's knowledge - actualnotice ofinfringement'(quotation omittedl).
Aside from infringem ent notices,however,Hoiile had no alternative m ethod for

preventing repeat infringem ent by its users. Couds often consider the degree of
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infringem entatissue and the defendant's efforts to stop repeatinfringers in determ ining
the reasonableness ofthe policy's im plementation. In Corbis Corp.,for instance,the
defendant had cancelled m illions ofoffending m erchantIistings,w arned such vendors
that ltrepeated violations of the rules may result in dperm anent suspension,'' and

ultim ately term inated hundreds of vendors.351 F.Supp.2d at 1103-05 & n.7. This
evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had m eaningfully responded to

allegations of copyright infringem entand thus,''properly im plem ented a procedure for
addressing copyright com plaints and enforcing violations of its policies.'' Id.at 1103.
Moreover,the plaintiffwas unable to show thatthe defendantS
'could have used another,
m ore effective and reasonable'' m ethod for preventing term inated users from reaccessing the service.

Id. at 1103-04.

Finally, addressing the l'appropriate

circum stances''Ianguage ofthe statute,the courtconcluded thatthere was insufficient
evidence that the defendant had know ledge of blatant infringem ent - such as user

statem ents aboutthe pirated nature ofa product,chatroom discussions regarding use

ofthe service for infringing purposes,orcharacteristics oflistings thatwould give away
their infringing nature - that would have required it to term inate user access. Id.at

1104-05. Thus,the defendantwas entitled to safe harborprotection.
By contrast,the district coud in In re Aim ster confronted a policy sim ilarto the
one at issue here that warned users not to post infringing content and prom ised to

term inate users who repeatedly violated copyrightlaw. The coud discounted the policy

as an llabsolute m irage''afterevidence showed thatthe defendants obstructed ways of
determ ining which users were transferring infringing files and, in practice, failed to

terminate a single user.In re Aimster,252 F.Supp.2d at658-59 & n.18 (declining safe
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harborprotection on motion forpreliminary injunction). Affirming the districtcoud on
appeal, the Seventh Circuitinstructed that a ''service provider m ust do what it can
reasonably be asked to do to preventthe use ofits services by drepeatinfringers.''' /d.

at655 (citation omitted). In a sim ilarvein,othercouds have held thatlùwhere a service
provider is given sufficient evidence to create actual knowledge of blatant, repeat

infringem ent by padicular users,padicularly infringement of a w illfuland com m ercial

naturej''itis com pelled to act. CybernetVentures,Inc.,213 F.Supp.2d at1176 (citing

legislative history). Still others have held that there are circumstances in which
operators m ustgo beyond m erely posting a policy in a site's terms ofuse,as Hotfile did.

See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc.,633 F.Supp.2d 124, 131 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).15
Here,the scale of activity - the notices of infringem ent and com plaints from

copyright holders - indicated to Hotfile that a substantial num ber of blatant repeat

infringers m ade the system a conduitfor infringing activity. Yet Hoiile did not acton

receipt of DM CA notices and failed to devise any actualpolicy of dealing w ith those
olenders,even ifitpublicly asseded otherwise. lthas presented no evidence to show
15

The Coud also notes thatm ostofthe ''robust''steps Hotfile claim s to have taken
to preventrepeatinfringem entrelate to its handling ofpadicularfiles and nottheir
users. Hotfile's SRA program is legally insufficient because, by its plain

Ianguage, Section 512(i) requires user term ination, thereby targeting future
infringementfrom an individualwho is deemed Iikely to recidivate. See Cybernet

Ventures;Inc.,213 F.Supp.2d at1176 ('
tlslection 512(i)isfocused on infringing
users,whereas 512(c) is focused primarily on the infringing materialitself.'').
More padicularly,while Section 512(c) requires service providers to remove
infringing material,Section 512(i)targetsthe source ofthatinfringement. See id.
(''Makingthe entrance intothe safe harbortoo wide would allow service providers
acting in com plicity w ith infringers to approach copyright infringem ent on an
im age by im age basis without ever targeting the source of these im ages.''

(citation om i
ttedl).
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that the sm all num ber of rem ovals that did occur were for any reason other than

threatened Iitigation orby coud order. lndeed,it has been unable to pointto a single

speci
fic userwho was term inated pursuantto its policy ofm anualreview and exercise
of 'discretion.'' Docum ents and stati
stics indicate that there was never any realistic

threat of term ination to Hotfile's users, whose activi
ties were protected by the

com pany's indi
fference to infringem ent notices. In sum ,regardless of officialpolicies
forbidding infringem ent, Hotfile did not significantl
y address the problem of repeat

infringers.Thisrenders Hotfile's policy legally insufficientunderSection 512(i).
Before Ieaving the issuesthe Court briefly addresses two otherpoints made by
Hotfile. First, Hotfile contends that the Studios should be equitably estopped from
asserting a DM CA challenge because of the parties' previous cooperation on
infringem ent issues. ln particular,they assert that W arner's participation in Hofile's

SRA program precludesthe Studios'DMCA argument(al
though itshould be noted that
not every Studio Plaintiff padicipated in the SRA program ,)

(Titov Decl.Ex.31 (DE 275-10 (filed
under seall; DE 321-31; DE 321-32) DE 321-33).) That individual later testified,
how ever,thathe was m erel
y ''being poiite''and did notcondone Hosile's actions.
Principles of estoppelappjy to copyright actions in the same m anner as they

apply to otheractions atiaw. Although the parties have notcited authority discussing a
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DMCA defense in padicular,a copyrightclaim can be waived if'.41)the plaintiffIknowsl
the facts ofthe defendant's infringing conduct;(2)the plaintiffIintends)thati
ts conduct
shallbe acted on orm ust so actthatthe defendant has a right to believe thatit is so

intended'
,(3)the defendant(is!ignorantofthe true facts;and (4)the defendant(reliesj
on the plaintiff's conductto its injury.'' Carson v.Dynegy,Inc.,344 F.3d 446,453 (5th
Cir.2003) (collecting authority). Here, although Hotfile has pointed to an isolated
discussion that m ay be useful in a cross-exam ination at trial, there are no facts to

sustain a conclusion thatthe Studios have acquiesced to Hotfile's conduct. The Studios

appearto have protected the rights to theircontent,and there is no suggestion thatthey

knew and approved ofthe extentofHotfile'sactions (orinaction).
Second,Hotfile has moved forpadialsummaryjudgmenton the applicability of
the DM CA to conductthatoccurred afterthis Iitigation was initiated. As suppod,Hotfile
provides evidence of a continuum of increased com pliance, such as applying new
fingerprinting and hashing technology,giving copyrightow ners access to Hotfile's SRA
program , and im plementing other Idpowerful counterm easures,' spanning from the
sum m erof2009 through Hotfile's retooling ofits affiliate program in February 2012,a
year after this Iitigation began. Some of this evidence shows that Hotfile took
m eaningful, recentsteps to com bat infringem ent. For exam ple, it is undisputed that

Hotfile adopted and began to im plem ent a three-strikes policy, resulting in the
term ination ofover20,000 ofits users afterthe stad ofthis litigation.Although the Court

is m indful that the DM CA does not specify the characteristics of a reasonably
im plem ented policy,it is unaware of any situation in which a three-strikes polic'
y has
been found to be ineffective. See,e.g., Viacom Int'lInc.v.YouTube,Inc.,718 F.Supp.
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2d 514,528-29 (S.D.N.Y.2010)rev'
d in pa# on othergrounds,676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2012)(discussing strike-based policies).
This requestto Iim itIiability raises questions ofw hethera pady can ever regain

the protections ofthe DM CA and w hetherthe Coud should trustHotfile notto reved to
their offending conduct'
,w hether the Coud can determ ine the exact point at which
Hotfile im plem ented a DM cA-com pliantpolicy and,ifso,whetherthe Coud should use
the date of technicalcom pliance as the point of entry to safe harbor or whether the

propermeasure should be when Hotfile ceased to be a hotbed forinfringement(since

many DMCA requirements have a prospective purposel;and whetherthe parties have
conducted a sufficientam ountof discovery forthe Coud to m ake these determ inations
atthis stage. However,in theirbriefing and ata day-long oralargum ent,the Studios
m ade clearthatthey have brought suit based on Hotfile's system and business m odel
''as they existed pre-com plaint''and thatpost-com plaintdam ages are nota partofthis
dispute. Accordingly, relying on these express representations and because the
Studios have not yet m ade any claim concerning post-com plaint damage,the Coud
need notdecide these issues and refrains from issuing an advisory opinion on Hotfile's
currentpractices.
2.

OtherDisqualifying Factors

Having concluded thata necessary precondition to DMCA safe harboreligibility a reasonably im plem ented repeat infringer policy - is Iacking as a m atterof Iaw,the

Coud concludes that Hotfile's DM CA defense fails. Nevedheless, the Court offers
observations and conclusions abouttwo ofthe rem aining DM CA requirements.
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a.

DM CA Agent

Section 512(c)(2) requires that a service provider ''designatel ) an agent to
receive notifications ofclaim ed infringem ent...by making available through its service,

including on its website in a Iocation accessible to the public,and by providing to the

CopyrightOffice,substantially the following information: (A)the name,address,phone
number,and electronic mailaddress ofthe agent.'' 17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(2). Perthe
express terms of the statute, '
tlojnly substantial compliance with the enumerated
requirements is required by subsection 512(c)(2),as is also the case with subsection

(c)(3).'' Perfect 10,Inc.L'
.Amazon.com,Inc.,No.CV 05-4753 AHM (SHx),2009 W L
1334364,at*8 (C.D.Cal.May 12,2009)(citing H.R.Rep.No.105-551(11)(1998)). The
legislative history forthe provision includes the following com m ittee statem ent,which
explains thatdecision:

The Com m ittee intends that the substantial com pliance standard in

subsections (c)(2)and (c)(3)be applied so thattechnicalerrors (such as

m isspelling a nam e,supplying an outdated area code ifthe phone num ber
is accom panied by an accurate address,orsupplying an outdated name if
accom panied by an e-m ailaddress thatremains valid forthe successorof

the priordesignated agentoragentofa copyrightowner)do notdisqualify
service providers and copyright owners from the protections afforded

undersubsection (c).The Comm ittee expects thatthe parties willcomply
with the functional requirem ents of the notification provisions-such as
providing sum cient inform ation so that a designated agent or the
complaining pafy subm itting a notification m ay be contacted eKcjenf/y-in
orderto ensure thatthe notification and take down procedures setfodh in
this subsection operate sm oothly.

S.Rep.No.105-190 (1998)(emphasis added). 1$
To prevailattrial,the service provider
has the burden of proving that it properly designated a copyright agent and that it
responded to notifications as required.' Perfect10,Inc.,2009 W L 1334364,at*8.
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Here,the record shows thatHotfile had a l'repod abuse''form on its website and
provided an e-m ail address w here users could repod infringing content. It did not

register a DM CA agentw ith the Copyright Office untilDecem ber2009.
,did notidentify
an agenton its website untilM ay 2010.
,and,to date,has notprovided a properm ailing

addressforitsregistered agentinsofaras itIistsonly a postoffice box. See 37 C.F.R.j
201.38(c)(noting thatthe submission ofan agentdesignation mustbearthe caption
'
tlnterim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claim ed Infringement''and

include, am ong other things, a Ssfull address''and not a tdpost office box or sim ilar
designation ...exceptwhere itis the only address thatcan be used in thatgeographic

Iocation'
'). W hile the statute focuses on whether someone with an infringement
com plaint would be able to contact the com pany, courts have held that substantial
com pliance in the DM CA context''means substantialcom pliance with aIIits clauses,not

justsome ofthem .'' Perfect10,Inc.V'
.Yandex N.U.,No.C 12-01521 W HA,2013 W L
1899851,at*3 (N.D.Cal.May 7,2013)(discussing 17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(3)). Thus,even
were Hotfile otherw ise able to availitselfofthe DMCA safe harbor,the Courtconcludes

thatitwould be ineligible underSection 512(c)(2)atleastthrough May 2010,the.date
on w hich itpublished its agent's contactinform ation. See Yandex,2013 W L 1899851,

at*7 (''The phrase dsubstantially aIIthe following information'modifies the ensuing the
subparagraphs that list types of contact information . ..it cannot excuse a failure to

provide the CopyrightOfficewith anyinformation ataII.'').
b.

ActualorRed Flag Know ledge
of Infringem ent

Finally,much ofthe Studios'briefing addresses Section 512(c)(1)(A)(i),which
requires that a defendant not have ''actualknow ledge that the m aterialor an activity
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using the m aterialon the system ornetwork is infringing''withoutrem oving it. 17 U.S.C.

j 512(c)(1)(A)(i). The safe harboralso requires thatthe defendantnothave knowledge
''offacts orcircumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent.'' 17 U.S.C.j
512(c)(1)(A)(ii). As one court interpreting the statute explained, 'ltlhe DMCA'S
protection of an innocent service provider disappears at the m om ent the service
providerloses its innocence,i.e.,atthe mom entitbecom es aware thata third pady is
using its system to infringe.'' ALS Scan,Inc.,239 F.3d at625. These provisions ofthe

DM CA are designed to ''deny safe harbor protection to Internet service providers
operating or linking to pirate sites whose illegal purpose is obvious to a reasonable

person.'' Mp3tunes,LLC,821 F.Supp.2d at 643-44 (citing S. Rep.No. 105-190

(1998)).
Nevedheless, there are two im podant Iim itations on disqualification. First,

Section 512(m)specifiesthata service providerhas no duty to monitoractivity occurring
on its service orto ''affirm atively seek facts indicating infringing activity,''which inform s

the knowledge analysis. 17 U.S.C.j 512(m). Second,because the statute elsewhere
im poses the requirem ent that providers rem ove every piece of m aterialidentified as

infringing,lslgleneralawareness oframpantinfringementis notenough to disqualify a
service providerofprotection.' Mp3tunes,LLC,821 F.Supp.2d at644. Instead,the

section dlrequires knowledge orawareness ofspecific infringing activity.'' Viacom Inth

Inc.,676 F.3d at 30-32 (collecting authority) ('l(T)he nature ofthe removalobligation
itself contem plates know ledge or awareness of specific infringing m aterial, because

expeditious rem ovalis possible only i
f the service provider knows w ith padicularity

which items to remove.''l'
, accord UMG Records, Inc.,2013 W L 1092793, at *11
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(declining to adopt11a broad conception ofthe knowledge requirement''and holding that
the safe harborrequiresdlspecificknowledge ofpadicularinfringing activity'').
Alternatively, d'the red flag provision turns on w hether the provider was

subjectively aware offacts thatwould have made the specific infringement'objectively'
obvious to a reasonable person.'' Viacom Intj lnc.,676 F.3d at31 (emphasis added).
Couds have recognized that while willfulblindness under the com mon law - i.e.,an
intentionaleffod to avoid guilty know ledge - can equate to actualknowledge,a DM CA

analysisshould notIose sightofthefocuson specificity.Id.at35 (''(W )illfuIIblindness()
m ay be applied,in appropriate circum stances,to demonstrate know ledge orawareness

ofspecific instances ofinfringementunderthe DMCA.'')'
,Tiffany (NJ) Inc.v.eBay Inc.,
600 F.3d 93,107,109-10 (2d Cir.2010). ln a recentdecision analyzing the competing
considerations of the statute, one coud concluded that a lack-of-knowledge defense
was a triable issue because severaldocum ents in the record could have been viewed

dtas im posing a duty to m ake fudherinquiries into tspecific and identifiable'instances of

possible infringem ent.'' Capitol Records, Inc.

M p3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931

(W HP),2013 W L 1987225,at*3 (S.D.N.Y.May 14,2013)(citationomitted).
W ith regard to Hotfile's actualknowledge,the Studios'proofconsists prim arily of
circum stantialevidence ofinfringement. The Studios assed thatHotfile does notserve
a prim arily lawfulpurpose,citing the facts thatHotfile pays users based on downloads

ratherthan uploads (suggesting thatitisa file sharing,ratherthanstorage,service)and
thata high percentage ofdownloaded files are infringing (suggesting infringing files are
the most popular and drive user activity). The Studios thus contend that Hotfile
resem bles other peer-to-peer file sharing networks that have been shut dow n,
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highlighted by the fact that Hotfile's business increased as som e of those system s
became inactive. As fudhersuppod,the Studios cite docum ents containing purpoded

adm issions thatHoiile is dlthe flagship ofnon-licensed content.''
ln response,Hotfile states that it provides a vehicle for the distribution offiles
w ith the authorization ofthe contentow nerand thatthe prim ary purposes of its system

are personal storage, ''space shifting'' and distribution of non-protected m aterials.
Indeed, Hotfile has shown thatone of the Studios used Hotfile to distribute its own
content. And Hotfile points to statistics showing that its network is actually used for
those purposes,observing that most files have never been downloaded (i.e,,most

uploaded files have notbeen retrieved by anotheruserl'
,thatthe mostpopular Iinks
currently available are fornoninfringing content(such as open-source software)thatis
meantto be freely copied and shared'
,thatthere is no search feature thatallows users

to locate files;and thatonly a smallpercentage offiles have been the subject ofa

DMCA notice orSRA action orhave been the subjectof infringement. According to
Hotfile, it is a sm allbusiness trying to eke out a reasonable profit in a prohibi
tively
Iitigious world.

Considering alIof the evidence,the Coud cannot say - and does not need to
determ ine - which Hotfile is before it. The testim ony,docum ents and evidence of

particularsystem characteristics create an issue offactfora jury as to whetherHotfile
knew or blinded itself to actualinfringem ent of padicular works,on a sm all or Iarge
scale. The m aster copy policy as it existed prior to this litigation,for instance,could

m ean thatHotfile was attuned to the infringing nature offiles,butm erely disabled the
offending Iink ratherthan rem oving the file itself. Because a significant num berofthe
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DMCA notices concerned the Studios' works, a jury could conclude that Hotfile
understood thatitwas continuing to m ake padicularinfringing contentavailable to the
public orthat,atthe very Ieast,itshould have investigated those files. Sim ilarly,to the
extent that com m unications with users should have aleded Hotfile to the infringing

nature offiles on its system thatwere owned by the Studios (such as users seeking
technicalassistance who indicated thattheirdifficulties were ow ing to the illegalnature

oftheiractivity),Hotfile mightbe deemed to have possessed red flag knowledge. See

UM G Recordings,Inc.,2013 W L 1092793,at*14 (stating thathad e-mails identifying
infringing contentcom e from a system 's users,ratherthan the copyrightowner,''itm ight

meetthe red flagtestbecause itspecified padicularinfringing material''). lndeed,based

ghteven determine thatHotfile should
on the evidence puton by the padies,a jury mi
have understood thatpadicularmaterialwas infringing (oratIeastshould have Iooked
into whetherinfringementwas occurring)when itbecame aware ofthe Iinkname.

But'$(a)s a generalrule,a pady's state ofmind (such as knowledge orintent)is a
question offactforthe factfinder,to be determ ined aftertrial.'' Chanel,Inc.v.Italian

ActivewearofFIa.,Inc.,931 F.2d 1474,1476 (11th Cir.1991).Thus,asto actual()rred
flag knowledge of infringem ent,the Coud concludes that a genuine issue of m aterial

factexists,and thisissuewould have to be resolved by ajuryattrial.
B.

Liability forInfringem ent

W ithout the benefit of the DM CA safe harbor,the Coud m ust stilldeterm ine
whetherHotfile is Iiable forthe copyrightviolations com m itted by its users. The DMCA

does notsupplantcom m on Iaw principles ofliability,and a finding thatsuch a protection
is unavailable does not necessarily m ean thatliability forinfringem enton the system is
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proper. See Columbia Pictures Indus.,Inc.k',Fung,710 F.3d 1020,1039-40 (9tl
n Cir.

2013)(''(W Je are notclairvoyantenough to be sure thatthere are no instances in which
a defendant otherw ise Iiable for contributory copyright infringement could m eet the
prerequisites forone orm ore ofthe DM CA safe harbors. W e therefore think itbestto

conduct the two inquiries independently - although, as willappear, aspects of the
inducing behaviorthatgive rise to liability are relevantto the operation ofsom e ofthe

DMCA safe harbors and can, in some circumstances, preclude their application.''l,
'

Perfect 10: Inc. e. Cybernet Ventures,Inc.,213 F.Supp.2d 1146, 1174 (C.D,Cal.
2002) (''These dsafe harbors'do notaffectthe question ofultimate Iiability underthe
various doctrines ofdirect,vicarious,and contributory liability ...Ratherthey Iim itthe

reliefavailable againstservice providers thatfallwithin these safe harbors.''l;cfkFlava
W orks,/nc.,689 F.3d at758 ('1(A)noninfringerdoesn'tneed a safe harbor.'').
Couds have struggled w i
th defining the Iiability ofInternet-based com panies that

provide the technologicalmechanism to foster,or at least enable,others to infringe.
This confusion and uncedainty prompted in pad the enactm entofthe DM CA. See,e.g.,

Sony Corp. of Am .

Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 n.17 (1984)

(''sony/Betamax''j (noting that ttthe lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious Iiability are not clearly drawn'
' (quoting district coud
decisionll;Flava W orks, Inc.,689 F.3d at76O (ldThe only distinctions relevantto this
case are between direct infringem ent ...and contributory infringem ent,and between

contributory infringementand noninfringement.'').
Even so,couds have recognized the value and remaining viability of a claim of
secondary liability: ''W hen a widely shared service or product is used to com m it
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infringem ent,it m ay be im possible to enforce rights in the protected work effecti
vely
against aII direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary Iiability on a theory of contributory or

vicarious infringem ent.'' M etro-Goldwyn-M ayer Studios,Inc.v.Grokste6 Ltd.,545 U.S.

913,929-30 (2005)(citation om i
ttedl;Perfect10,Inc.v.Amazon.com,Inc.,508 F.3d
1146,1171 n.11 (9th Cir.2007) (s
llcjopyrightholders cannot protecttheirrights in a
m eaningful way unless they can hold providers of such services or products

accountable for their actions.') These theories of secondary liability - contributory
infringem ent,inducem entIiability and vicarious liability - are coud-created and do not
rely on the CopyrightActoranotherstatute. See Viacom lnt'lInc.,676 F.3d at28 n.5

(citing Grokster,545 U.S.at930-31),
'Perfect10,lnc.B.Visa Int'lSelv.Ass'
n,494 F.3d

788,795 (9th Cir.2007) (''contributory copyrightinfringementis a form ofsecondary
liabilitywi
th roots inthe tod-law conceptsofenterprise liability and imputed intent.'').
1.

Inducem entand Contributory Infringem ent

The Supreme Court's sem inal2005 deci
sion in Grokster observed that '
slolne
infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing orencouraging directinfringement,' 545

U.S.at929. ddlclontributory Iiability is based on the defendant's failure to stop its own
actions which facilitate third-pady infringem ent.'' Am azon.com ,Inc.,508 F.3d at 1175.
The theory has two requirem ents: (1)the defendantknows ofdi
rectinfringement,and

(2)the defendantd
tinduces,causes,ormateriallycontributes to Ithatlinfringing conduct.'
Napsten Inc.,239 F.3d at1020 (internalquotation and citations omitted). To ''estabfish
inducement Iiability, it is crucial to establish that the distributors com m unicated an
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inducing message to their...users.''' Visa Int'lSem .Ass'
n,494 F.3d at801 (internal
quotation omitted).
Thus,to establish this derivative Iiability,a plaintiffm ustfirstmake a prim a facie
case of direct infringem ent by a third pady,w hich is done by proving ow nership of a
padicularwork and evidence ofunauthorized copying. Napsten Inc.,239 F.3d at 1013

n.2;Situation Mgmt.Sys.:Inc.B.ASP Consulting LLC,56O F.3d 53,58 (1stCir.2009)
(quoting FeistPublbs,Inc.v.RuralTel.Serz Co.,499 U.S.340,361 (1991)). In this
case,the padies do notdispute thatthe Studios own 3,800 works atissue and thatthey
have properly registered them underSection 411 ofthe CopyrightAct. Moreover,w hile
Hotfile takes issue with the Studios'm ethod forproving infringem ent,itdoes notdispute
thatatIeastsome ofthe Studios'works have been illegally copied ordownloaded using
the Hotfile system . This has caused the Studios to Iose m oney they would have earned
from Iicensing the content to users and because ofthe threat of fudherdow nstream
S'viral''distributions. The W aterm an study and the facts of the counterclaim provide
com petentproofin thatregard'
,any otherquestions m erely go to the Ievelofdamages.
CL Fung,710 F.3d at1034.
The m ore vexing question here concerns the hallm ark ofthis type of Iiability whetherintentcan be expressly shown orinferred from Hotfile's actions. The Studios
allege thatinfringem ent is a naturalconsequence of Hotfile's business model;thatthe
com pany ''actively fosters''m assive copyrightinfringem entto increase its revenue;and
thatdespite storing allinfringing contenton its servers,i
tfailed to m itigate infringem ent.
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a.

Grokster-type Intent

In this regard,couds have held thateven though an entity m erely distributes a
device that causes infringement, it m ay nonetheless be Iiable for inducement if the

defendanthas 'sthe objectofpromoting its use to infringe copyright,as shown by clear
expression orotheraffirm ative steps taken to fosterinfringem ent.'' Grokster,545 U.S.

at 919. Liabili
ty m ay be im posed ''if the actor knowingly takes steps that are

substantially cedain to resultin ()directinfringement.'' Amazon.com:Inc.,508 F,3d at
1170. Or,a defendant can encourage or induce infringem ent through cedain acts,
'ssuch as advedising an infringing use orinstructing how to engage in an infringing use.''

Grokster,545 U.S.at 936 (citations and internalquotations om i
tted). In addition to
these m ethods ofdirectly proving intent,an actorm ay be Iiable underoldercom mon Iaw

theories based on im puting intent,such as by knowing ofspecific acts ofinfringement
and failing to act orby providing 'm aterialsuppod''to those w ho com m it infringem ent.
As discussed below ,there is disagreement as to the parameters of these doctrines,

w hetherthey continue to apply,and what defenses may be applicable to counterthe
deleterious effectthey m ay have on innovation and the benefits oftechnology.
The decision in Groksfer illustrates whatunquestionably suffices to show actual

intent. There, a group of copyright holders consisting of recording com panies,
songwriters and m usic publishers sued com panies that distributed software products
enabling peer-to-peerfile sharing among users. 545 U.S.at919. The defendants did
notm aintain copies offiles on theirservers,did not know which files their users were
transm i
tting,and did noteffectively controluser-behavior. Id.at920 & n.1,922. But
evidence showed that'dthe probable scope ofcopyrightinfringementis staggering''and
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thatthe defendants were aware ofthe nature ofthe infringem ent. Id.at923. Sim ilarto

the facts ofthis case,an exped com m issioned by one ofthe plaintiffs concluded that90
percent of the files on one of the systems were infringing, although the defendants
raised m ethodological challenges, suggested that the software had significant
noninfringing uses,and provided other'danecdotaland statisticalevidence''to show that

files m ightnothave been copyrightprotected. Id.at922-23. Finally,e-m ails from users
''with questions about playing copyrighted m ovies they had downloaded'
' and
notifications from one of the plaintiffs about the infringing nature of cedain files
dem onstrated the defendants'knowledge ofthe factofinfringement. Id.at923.
The Coud w entbeyond know ledge of infringem ent,however,to address actual

evidence of intent. Itconcluded thatthe defendants l
dclearly voiced the objective that
recipients use it to dow nload copyrighted works, and each took active steps to
encourage infringement.'' Id.at923-24. In particular,one ofthe defendants designed
and advedised software to com pete with a system that was ruled to have been

infringing (Napster),thereby ''aiming to satisfy a known source ofdemand forcopyright
infringem ent.'' Id.at 924,939. Their business m odels were centered on advertising
revenue driven by the popularity of content,which the coud equated w i
th infringing

content and which confirmed dlthat (defendants') principal object was use of their
software to download copyrighted works.''Id.at926 (dlusers seeking Top 40 songs,for
exam ple,orthe Iatestrelease by M odest Mouse,are cedain to be farm ore num erous
than those seeking a free Decameron,and Grokster and Stream cast translated that
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dem and into dollars '')16 Finally,the Coud found thatcom panies failed to develop tools
.

''to diminish the infringing activi
ty loflusing theirsoftware,''thereby underscoring their
d'intentionalfacili
tation oftheirusers'infringem ent.'' Id.at939.

After discussing the plaintiffs'prima facie case of Iiability for inducement and
vicarious Iiability,which fallunderthe um brella ofsecondary Iiability,the GroksterCourt
considered defenses. In padicular,itdiscussed its holding in Sony/Betam ax,w hich the
coud of appeals had applied in affirm ing the district coud's grant of sum mary

judgment.17 That decision applied the ''staple adicle of commerce doctrine'
' and
concluded thatan actordistributing a com mercialproduct(such as a video recording
device) is not Iiable for acts of infringement, even i
f it knows of actual or likely
infringem ent, unless the product is incapable of substantial noninfringing uses.

Grokster,545 U.S.at932-333 (discussing the holding ofSony/Betamax). The Court
soughtto balance the harm s thatinfringem enthas on copyrightowners w ith the effect
Iiability m ight have in stifling com m erce and innovation, Thus, it suggested thatthe
doctrine applies only to circum stances where no intentto prom ote infringing uses can
be im puted from the design of a distributed productand where the defendant has not

d
lexpressed an object'ofbringing aboutinfringement,such as by advedising uses that
16

This was contrary to the district coud's conclusion that the defendants were

entitled to summ aryjudgmentand its reasoning thatdistributing the software S
'did
not provide the distributors w i
th actual knowledge of specific acts of

infringement.' Id.at927 (citing districtcoud decision).
Sim ilarto the appellate coud's holding,prior precedent in the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Sony/Betam ax applies to all forms of contributory Iiability.

Cable/Home Comm '
n Corp.v.Network Prods.,Inc.,9O2 F.2d 829,845 (1l'
th Cir.
1990)(slcontributory infringementwillnotbe found ifthe productin question is
capable of'substantialnoninfringing uses,'the determ inative issue in Sony,and

clarified in that case as wide use ffor Iegitimate, unobjectionable purposes.'''
(quoting Sony/8elamax,464 U.S.at442)).
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are necessarily infringing. Id.at933. ln otherwords,the Sony/Betam ax rule doe'
s not
barIiability where a plaintiffpleads an inducem enttheory ofsecondary Iiability prem ised

on actualevidence of intent. Id.at 933 (''Sony barred secondary Iiability based on
presum ing orim puting intentto cause infringementsolely from the design ordistribution

ofa productcapable ofsubstantiallawfuluse,which the distributorknows is in factused
forinfringement....Because Sony did notdisplace othertheories ofsecondary Iiability,

and because we find below that it was error to grant sum mary judgment to the
companiesonMGM'S inducementclaim ,we do notrevisitSonyfurther.'').
The GroksterCoud concluded that''one who distributes a device with the object
of prom oting its use to infringe copyright, as show n by clear expression or other
affirm ative steps taken to foster infringem ent, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringem ent by third padies,''and, in that instance, the staple adicle of com m erce
doctrine does not act as an affirm ative defense. ld. at 936-37. A showing of intent
requires evidence of active steps taken to entice or persuade anotherto infringe and
cannot be established from dsm ere knowledge of infringing potentialj''llactualinfringing

'ordinary acts
uses,''''a failure to take affirm ative steps to prevent infringem ent,''or d
incidentto productdistribution,such as offering custom ers technicalsuppod orproduct

updates.'' /d.at 935-37,939 n.12,940 (stating thatthe factthata business model

benefits from infringem entcould notalone 'justify an inference of unlawfulintent,but
viewed in the contextofthe entire record its impod is clear'). Instead,Iiability m ustbe
prem ised on ''purposeful, culpable expression and conduct.'' Id.at937.
Based on the evidence presented,the Coud in Groksfer found an ''unlaw ful

objective'
'thatwas lunmistakeable'': the system was used predominately to infringe.
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The Coud predicated its conclusion on the facts that the defendants learned of the
infringing nature of use when providing technicalassistance'
he business com peted
, t
with anothersystem whose users were know n to have infringed'
he business m odel
, t
was driven by the availability of unlicensed content'
endants took no
, and the def
m eaningfulsteps to preventinfringem ent.l8 /J. at941.
b.

MaterialContribution Liability

Developing guidance for som e of Grokster's unanswered questions, a m ore
recent case from the Southern District of New York reviewed the file sharing service

Lim eW ire and addressed how the legal theories of inducement of infringem ent,
contributory infringem ent,com m on Iaw infringem entand unfaircom petition fittogether.

Lim e Group,784 F.Supp. 2d at 409. The service at issue em ployed peer-to-peer
technology through which software created by the defendants took an inventory offiles
on users'com puters and allowed others to search forand download them directly. Id.
at 410-411. The sam e exped engaged by the Studios in this case, Dr.W aterm an,
concluded that 98.8 percent of the files dow nloaded through LimeW ire were not

authorized forfree distribution and that43.6 percentofthose files were owned by the
plaintils in the action. Id. at 412. The coud determ ined that there was sufficient

evidence of direct infringem ent by Lim eW ire users and that the W aterman repod
provided com petentproofofthe scope ofthatinfringem ent. Id.at422-24.

On the issue of Groks/estype inducement, the coud found that sum m ary

judgmentin favorofthe plainti
ffs was warranted. Id.at426. Evidence cited by the
18

Ultim ately,

on remand,the districtcoud entered summary judgmentin favorof

the plaintiffs on the issue of Iiability. Metro-Goldwyn-M ayer Studios, Inc.

GroksteriLtd.,454 F.Supp.2d 966,999 (C.D.Cal.2006).
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coud to establishthe defendants'awarenessofinfringementincluded: (1)the scope of
the infringement, which revealed that ldm ost actual dow nloads involve unauthorized

contenti''(2)internalcom municationsthatnotonly noted thatuserswere sharing digital
recordings,butalso acknowledged thatthey were copyrighted (including a documentin
which the defendants considered legitim i
zing and monetizing useractivityl;(3)the fact
thatthe infringing nature ofthe activity was com m unicated to defendants through user
e-m ails and the com pany m aintained adicles about infringem ent in a file Iabeled

''Knowledge oflnfringementi''and (4)the factthatthe defendants provided technological
assistance with files that'plainly relateld)to unauthorized sharing ofdigitalrecordings.''
Id.at426-28.

Moreover, Iike the network in Grokster, the defendants developed business
strategies to target users of shuttered networks;their advedisem ents intim ated illegal
uses;and their revenue relied on the popularity of contentthat was indirectly tied to

infringement. Id.at427-29. Otherattributes ofthe LimeW ire software suggested thatit
was designed with infringem entin m ind. The program notonly enabled searches,but
also suggested popular and copyrighted recordings to users; the defendants even

tested its functionality using protected titles. Id.at428. Moreover,the defendants failed
to im plem ent any sod of technicalbarrier ordesign choice to dim inish infringem ent'
,

instead,w hile existing technology could have been applied to infringing works,that

filtering technology was disabled by default(and had to be enabled by users). /d.at
429-430. Finally,the defendants had consi
dered alternative business m odels,including

opening a store to guide users to Iicensed content. /d. This evidence was su#icientto
show the sam e kind ofunm istakeable intentas existed in Grokster.
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Butin addressing othercom m on Iaw principles ofsecondary infringem ent,Judge

W ood concluded that summary judgmentwas inappropriate. The decision made a
distinction between inducem entliability,which requires Grokster-Lype evidence ofintent,
and contributory infringem ent Iiability, w hich does not so long as a defendant's
contribution to infringing activities is dfm aterial.''19 Id.at 432

.

Under the contributory

infringem enttheory ofIiability,the coud found thatthe evidence was sufficientto show
the defendants'knowledge ofand m aterialcontribution to substantialinfringing ad ivity.
Id. at 434. However, applying the Sony/Betam ax rule, the coud found there was
insufficient evidence that the Lim eW ire service was incapable of substantial
noninfringing uses. Id. The coud observed that,while the Lim eW ire service was used

'overwhelm ingly for infringem ent' at the time of the decision, the deferldants
dem onstrated substantial noninfringing uses that existed or were Iikely to develop,

19

The decision reasoned that Groksfer answered the question of inducement
liability but failed to determ ine l
dwhether the Ninth Circuit had been correct in

granting summaryjudgmenton the contributory infringementclaim .' Id.at433.
The concurring opinions in Grokster debated whether the noninfringing uses

identified by the defendants were sufficientto merit summary judgment, but
agreed thatthe Sony/Betam ax rule continues to actas a defense to contributory

infringement. Id.at 433 (citing concurring opinionsl'
,see also Alfred C,Yen,
Torts and the Construction ofInducem entand Contributory Liability in Am azon
and Visa,32 Colum J.L.& Ads 513,513 (2009) ('tIn (Groksferl,the Suprem e
Court adopted intentional inducement as a cause of action for third pady
copyright Iiability. Before Grokster, such Iiability existed in two form s,
contributory Iiability and vicarious Iiability
Now ,after Groksfer,a defendant

also faces Iiability ifshe actswith the objectofpromoting infringementbyothers.''
(footnote om ittedl). Other decisions have suggested that two categories of
contributory infringement liability exist - ''actively encouraging (or inducing
infringementthrough speci
fic acts or()distributing a productdistributees use
to infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable of lsubstantial' or
dcom mercially significant'noninfringing uses'
'- and thatSony/Betam ax serves as
a defense where the Iatter is asseded. Am azon.com , Inc.,508 F.3d at 1170

(quoting Grokster,545 U.S.at942 (Ginsburg,J.,concurringl).
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including distribution ofnon-protected works. Id. Thus,underthe Lim e Group analysis,
the Sony/Betam ax rule m ay stillbe raised as a theory of defense w here the intentto
infringe or induce infringem ent is notexplicit,butratheris im puted from a defendant's

m aterialcontribution to infringem ent.
Severalother couds have considered the m aterialcontribution theory ofliability

but have not always addressed the applicability of the Sony/Betam ax defense under

thattheory. In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir.q996),
operators of a swap m eet where counterfeit goods were sold were deem ed to have

provided the ''
suppod services''for infringem ent, including ''the provision of space,
utilities, parking, advedising, plum bing, and custom ers,' such that the swap m eet
operators could be held Iiable. Id. at 263. Extending that theory of Iiability to the
Internetcontext,the districtcoud in Napslerfound the search and directory features of
the m usic sharing program to be ldan Internet swap m eet.' A&M Records; Inc.

Napsten Inc.,114 F.Supp.2d 896,919-20 (N.D.Cal.2000)(quoting briefing),aff'd in
parf& rev'd in parl,239 F.3d 1004,1022 (9th Cir.2001). O n appeal,albeit in a preGrokster decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the Sony/Betam ax defense was
applicable to instances in which intentto prom ote infringem entwas im puted from the

structure ofthe system ,butinapplicable to instances w here the defendanthas identi
fied
speci
fic inform ation regarding infringing acti
vity. Napsfer,239 F.3d at 1020-22. W hile

the coud concluded that the defendants were also Iiable under a Fonovisa material
contribution theory,itdid notaddress whetherthe Sony/Betam ax defense applies under
thattheory. Id.at 1022.
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ln In re Aimster,''lilnstead ofparking spaces,advedisements,and plumbing,''the
defendants 'provided the softw are and the suppod services necessary for individual

Aimsterusers to connectwith each other...managlinglto do everything butactually
stealthe m usic offthe store shelfand hand itto Aim sterusers.'' 252 F.Supp.2d at659.
The coud disallowed the Sony/Betamax defense,reasoning thatthe online network had

an ongoing relationship with the direct infringer,as opposed to m erely providing the
m eans to com m itinfringem entin a single point-of-sale transaction,Iike selling a VCR an argum entaggressively pursued by the Studios in this case.20 M oreover, the Aim ster

technology perm itted m ass distribution of infringing content ratherthan 'private,hom e
use copyinga'' Id. at 653. Rather than focusing solely on the features of the tstaple
article of com m erce doctrine,the decision m ade a distinction that would be echoed
three years Iater in Grokster : there was both a Iack ofevidence thatthe technology

had legitim ate purposes and significantevidence thatthe defendantintended to foster
infringem ent. Id.at652-64.

Forthe m ost pad,as in Lim e Group,recentdecisions have suggested thatthe
Sony/Betam ax rule applies w hereverm aterialcontribution is atissue. See,e.g.,Capitol

Records,LLC v.ReDigiInc.,No.12 Civ.95 (RJS),2013 W L 1286134,at*13 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar.30,2013) (dHowever,even where a defendant's contribution is material,it may
evade liability if its product is tcapable ofsubstantialnoninfringing uses.'''(quoting

Sony/Betamax,464 U.S.at442)).
20

W hile other couds have used this distinction to decline to apply the
Sony/Betam ax rule,this Coud includes the analysis ofan ongoing relationship in
the vicarious liability context. As explained below, that theory of Iiability
exam ines a defendant's relationship with,and controlover,direct infringers to

hold the defendantIiable,justas a principalmay be Iiable forthe actions ofhis
agent.
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C.

Know ledge ofInfringing Content
and Failure to Rem ove

Finall
y,the Ninth Circuit's decision in Perfect1O,Inc.v.Am azon.com ,Inc.shows
thatthe Groksterdecision does notforeclose othercom mon Iaw principles of im puting

intent. In padicular,a providerm ay face Iiability w here itknows ofpadicular instances
of infringem ent - rather than sim ply that the system is capable of infringement or

generally peqm its som e Ievelof infringem ent- and fails to actto rem ove it. There,a

copyrightownersued two companies,one ofwhich (Google)operated a search engine
thatperm itted users to search the Internetforim ages and facilitated downloads ofthose
im ages from third-pady w ebsites by Iinking to them . 508 F.3d at1155-56. O n the issue
of secondary infringem ent, it was undisputed that the third padies did not have
perm ission to display plainti
ff's im ages on their websi
tes and that som e direct
infringem enthad occurred. Id.at1169.

The padies disagreed, however, as to whether Google fostered infringem ent
through specific acts under Groksler. Although there was no suggestion that Google
actually induced copyright infringem ent, the Ninth Circuit applied com m on Iaw tod

principles offault-based Iiability to reason that''an actorm ay be contributorily çiable for
intentionally encouraging directinfringem entifthe actorknowingly takes steps that are
substantially certain to resultin directinfringem ent.'' Id.at1170-71 & n.11. Italso relied
on its pçe-Groksterdecision in Napsfer,w hich held that'
ùifa com putersystem operator
learns ofspecific infringing m aterialon his system and fails to purge such m aterialfrom

the system , the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringem ent'' under a
m aterialcontribution theory. Id.at 1171. The coud was persuaded by the reasoning
that secondary infringem ent should be available to provide a practicalm echanism for
70
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preventing direct infringem ent. Id.at 1172. Because the district coud had applied a

differentstandard and there was evidence thatS'Google substantially assistled)websites

to distribute (users')infringing copies to a worldwide marketand assistled)a worldwide
audience of users to access infringing m aterials,''Google could have been Iiable if it
failed to take sim ple m easures to preventdam age to the plaintiff. Id.21
d.

Application ofPrecedent

Against this body of jurisprudence, the Coud sets out the standard for
inducem entand contributory infringem entliability itapplies here. First,w hile itm ay be
unclearw hetherGroksferintroduced a new category ofIiability based on inducem entor
whether it spoke to pre-existing notions of contributory liability, it is evident that a
defendantwillbe liable foractually expressing an intention to fosterinfringem ent. Ifthat

intent is express or can otherwise be said to be 'unm istakeable,'the Sony/Betam ax
defense w illnotapply and the defendantwillbe liable foraIIacts ofdirect infringement

com m itted using its system , as was the case in Groksfer. Sim ilarly,as explained in
Am azon.com ,where traditionalprinciples perm ita coud to im pute intent- forinstance,
where the defendantknows ofspecific infringing contentavailable on its system yetfails

to remove it - that defendant may be Iiable,by operation of Iaw,just as ifhe had
actually intended to infringe under Groksler. Finally,contributory infringem entm ay be

21

On remand,the district coud rejected the plaintiff's requestfor a preliminary
injunction because the plaintiff failed to show that individual notices of
infringem entthathad elicited no response were adequate to conferknowledge of
infringem enton Google. Perfect 10,Inc.v.Google, Inc.,No.CV 04-9484 A HM

(SHx),2010 W L 9479060,at*6-7 (C.D.Cal.July 30,2010). Plaintiffalso failed
to show that practical and sim ple m easures to prevent infringem ent were
available to Google as a viable rem edy. Id.at*7. Norcould the plainti: m eetthe

otherrequirements fora prelim inary injunction. Id.at*14. The decision was
affirmed,653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.2O11),and cediorariwas denied by the Supreme
Coud,132 S.Ct.1713 (Mar.5,2012).
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found based on a m aterialcontribution theory in instances where a defendantdid not
express an intention to foster infringem entbut provided the m eans for infringem ent or
distributed a comm ercialproduct that was subsequently used to infringe. Underthat

theory,the Sony/Betam ax rule provides a backstop to Iiability,im m unizing a defendant
who dem onstrates that noninfringing uses ofthe system are substantial. The Studios
have raised claims and presented facts related to each ofthese theories ofIiability.

As a prelim inary m atter,itshould be understood thatalthough Hotfile has m any
unique characteristics, it is also true that i
t shares m any of the attributes that have

doom ed other networks 22 M ost notably, the Coud concludes that the extent of
.

infringem ent by Hotfile's users was staggering,as was the case in Grokster. O n this
point,Hotfile questions the W aterm an study and its finding ofa respective 90.2% and

5.3% rate of infringem ent and noninfringem ent based on an exam ination offiles that
had been downloaded. The Coud agrees thatthe study assum ed an infringing purpose
and thatan exam ination ofuploaded files - including those thatwere nevershared or
downloaded - would Iikely have shown a Iower infringem entrate and aiternative uses

forHotfile's system apartfrom infringement(as Hotfile's exped,Dr.James Boyle,points
out). ltmay also be true,as Hotfile argues,thatthe W aterman study exam ined too

short of a time period (i.e., one month of data) and improperly excluded entire
categories offiles thatw ould have resulted in an even Iowerrate,

Despite Hotfile's quarrel with the W aterman rate and suggestion that it is
som ewhathigh,i
tcannotdispute thatan enorm ous am ountofinfringem enthas actually

22

The Studios contend that Hotfile is sim ilarto otherinfringing networks,such as
G rokster,Fung,Stream cast,Usenet.com ,and Lim eW ire.
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occurred on Hotfile's system . Forexam ple,the record reflects a Iarge num berofDM CA
notices received by Hotfile - eight m illion in total. As is explained in the Coud's

discussion ofthe counterclaim ,only a relatively sm allnumberofthe notices pedaining

to W arnerhave been claimed to be incorrect and noninfringing,suggesting the sam e
m ay be true ofthe othersets of notices Hotfile received from the Studios. M oreover,

while the Coud cannotdeduce that every file posted by a repeat infringer is actually

infringing,the uploads ofthose subjectto three ormore notices constituted 44 percent
ofaIIfiles on Hotfile (and halfofalldownloaded files)in February 2O11. Atthe very
Ieast,this shows thata high num berofHotfile users Iikely engaged in infringem ent- the

vastmajority ofHotfile'stop affiliates,and wellover20,000 ofits users- and were likely
responsible for a substantial am ount of infringem ent. Indeed, the Studios have
identi
fied over 900,000 files containing their own works that were available for the
taking. These num bers are consistentwith the dem onstrated outcom e of Hotfile's post-

Com plaint policy changes, which Hotfile asseds were effective in com batting
infringem entand resulted in the term ination ofaffiliates and users,deletion offiles,and
a substantialdrop in revenue.

The Court can also conclude that Hotfile became aw are of the generalfact of
infringem ent- although possibly notits scale - atleastwhen itreceived DM CA notices
through its agent and when it was sued orthreatened with suit by copyright holders.

Docum ents produced in discovery suggestthatHotfile was aware itwas becom ing ''the
flagship ofnon-licensed contenti''thatifithad exam ined the files on its system ,itwould

have known of the infringing activity'
, and that it was doing business with those it
suspected were infringers Iike the affiliate Planetsuzy. Hotfile provided the m eans of
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infringement'
, it created and currently m aintains the Ho/ile website, which Hoiile's
m em bers actually use to infringe. Users even store the infringing contenton Hotfile's
own servers, in contrast to decentralized peer-to-peer networks, in w hich the
inform ation resides on users'com puters.
Finally,there is som e evidence suggestive of a deliberate design to facilitate

infringement. Hotfile is deliberately m odeled after networks thatwere subsequently

subjectto challenges ofinfringement;its incentive structure rewards Iarge and frequent
file downloads'
, it pays mem bers through an affiliate program ; and it relies on the
popularity ofcontentto drive grow th,even im ploring users to postuinteresting''Iinks and
m edia files. The factthat it actually pays infringers forthis activity is,as the S'
tudios

argue in briefing,''sim ply unprecedented.' Hotfile also provides technicalassistance to
those w ho infringe,b0th by answering speci
fic questions from users aboutdownloading
m edia and by providing tutorials thatreference copyrighted works. And,despite having

the means to implement counter-piracy technologies and to target infringemel
nt (as
demonstrated by Hotfil
e's actions immediately afterthe Complaintwas filed),Hotfile did
not take any m eaningfulaction to cudailinfringem ent. M oreover, it did not have an
effective policy to term inate blatant,repeatinfringem ent,which constituted a substantial
am ount of the total infringement, until February 2O11. Based on the totality of the
evidence,the Coud concludes that Hotfile was successfulin Iarge pad because itdid

notcontrolinfringem entactivity on its system .
Nonetheless,the Coud draws distinctions between this case and the case Iaw

recited above in which couds determ ined thatjudgmenton the question ofsecondary
Iiability was proper. Forinstance,despite an increase in usertraffic,the Studios have
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show n neither that Hotfile's inspiration,Rapidshare,actually w as a pirate network nor
that Hotfil
e targeted Rapidshare's users to satisfy a known source of dem and for
tuation in cases finding Iiability for networks
copyright infringem ent, as was the si

attem pting to becom e the next Napster. Indeed, as shown by th

e-m ail,

Hotfile apparently viewed the migration ofRapidshare users as a ubad thing.' (Yeh
Decl.Ex.53 (DE 288-58 (filed underseall;DE 324-11).) Moreover,Hotfile did not
prom ote any ofits files orenable a 5le search function,butinstead relied on third-party

affiliates that were responsible for promoting (and essentially making available)
infringing content. AII infringing activity thus took place between uploading users,

downloading users and affiliates (and not Hotfile). Additionally, the system has
noninfringing uses ignored in the Studios'focus on downloading activity,such as the
distribution of unlicensed m ateriais. And Hotfile eventually developed a notice and

takedown system and,overtim e,im plem ented technoiogy to com batinfringing users.
Hotfile's general know ledge of infringem ent,even if ram pant, is insufficient by
itsel
fto suppod Iiability. The Studios have notproffered an express statem entby Hottile
indicating its intention to foster copyright infringem ent, that is. clearly voicing an

objective of encouraging infringement. Not one docum ent shows a business plan
contem plating infringing uses or an understanding that Hotfile was actually assisting

users (individually or as a whole) to commit infringement. Hotfile had no direct
involvement in the acts of infringement (as would be the case i
f its employees had

posted the Studios' copyrighted content). Unlike Lime Group, there were no

ionsiderations (and rejections) of counter-piracy software, internalcommunicati
ons
acknowledging the illegalnatare ofspecific network activity,orproposals to legitimize
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useractivity. Unlike Grokster,the intentto infringe is not''unm istakeable''such thatit

can be said to be centralto the business modeland ingrained in the platform 's design.
Indeed,Hotfile has,atIeast,a plausible alternative design m odelin the form ofpersonal
data storage.23
Although som e evidence shows that Hotfil
e m ight have been on notice that

specific acts ofinfringem entwere afoot,the evidence does notdem onstrate thatHotfile
knew forcedain thatthe uses were illegalorthatHotfile induced the infringing use. For
exam ple,the Studios assed that users put Hotfile on notice thatthey were purchasing
prem ium accounts S
lspecifically to download copyrighted works.'' But the docum ent
suppoding this assedion is an e-m ailfrom a prospective userto a Hotfile e-m ailaddress

stating that he '
dwishledj to sign up to Hotfile to down load''eightldEbooks''of older
novels including Dickens's A Christmas Carol. (Yeh Decl.Ex.66 (DE 324-12).) ltis
plausible thata service provider,foreign ordom estic,m ightbelieve thata work from a

19th century English writeris no Iongersubjectto copyrightprotection. The document
shows no response from Hotfile endorsing an illegaluse,and nothing aboutthe request
suggests thatthe user's downloads would be blatantly infringing.
The Studios also allege that Hotfile '
drepeatedly provided technicalassistance to

users they knew were seeking to download (infringing)content,'such as by answering
userquestionswhen the link's URL was apparentto Hotfile.(Hotfile could see the URL
path ofthe Iastfile downloaded in every com m unication ) But Hotfile points out thatit
.

had no way of knowing w hetherthe user Iacked perm ission to share the file,whether

23

Based on data,Dr. Boyle concluded that there were substantial noninfringing
uses in the form ofopen source software and m ovie sharing,fairuse downioads,
storage,and m onetizing works ow ned by creators through the affiliate program .
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the file contained whatthe title indicated,orwhetherthe work was actually protected by
copyright. Indeed,the evidence shows that when users indicated to Hotfile thatthey
were accessing padicularcontent,they did nothing to conclusively inform Hotfile ofthe

fact of infringem ent. W hile the Studios contend that by rewarding distribution of Iarge

and populardownloads (in contrast to promoting storage),Hotfile knew that itwas
encouraging the sharing of protected m usic and m ovies, no docum ents show that

Hotfile equated popularcontentwith protected content.
Thus,w ith respectto each exam ple raised by the Studios,a num berofquestions

remain regarding Hotfile's intent (actualor im puted) to foster infringement and the
capacity forand scope of noninfringing uses ofHotfile's system . Forexam ple: lNhen
Hotfile suppoded useractivity orcom m unicated with affifiates,did itknow thatthe files
actually contained copyrighted m aterialas the link names ordiscussion indicated? Did

Hotfile know thatthe works are currently protected by copyright? Did Hotfile know w hen

users lacked permission to download cedain works (which would nothave been the
case if the works were user-owned and ''space-shifted,''or if the files were freely-

Iicensed, as the most popular downloads on Hotfile currently are)? W as Hotfile
designed,and is itprim arily used,forstorage orfordistribution? lfthe Iatter,did Hotfile
intend to promote the infringem ent of copyrighted work, or did it m erely provide a

service that was ultim ately used to infringe? Did Hotile encourage the sharing of
protected content,thereby crossing the threshold from knowledge of infringement to
fostering infringem ent? In sum ,unlike othercases where the evidence ofintentis m ore
com pelling,the record here does not provide an unequivocalpicture. The fact that

these questions remain makes summary judgment inappropriate on the theories of
77
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inducem entand contributory infringem entliability. And while Hotfile m ay have a difficult

time explaining its ''innocence'
'to a jury,24the genuine issues Ofmaterialfactmustbe
resolved bya juryattrial.
2.

Vicarious Iiability

The Studios next assed that Hotfile is vicariously Iiable for the actions of its
users. In contrastto contributory Iiability,which focuses on the defendant'
s actions in

enabling infringem ent,''vicarious liability is based on the defendant's failure to cause a

third pady to stop its directly infringing activities.' Am azon.com ,Inc.,508 F.3d at 1175

(citations om itted). Vicarious copyrightliability has been described as a variation ofthe
doctrine ofrespondeat superior - a form of strict liability prem ised on agency. See
Fonovisa, Inc.,76 F.3d at262.Thus,the doctrine does not require knowledge of the

infringem entand m ay be applied even w here the defendanthas acted in good faith to
prevent it /d 25 vicarious infringement has two elem ents,occurring Ilwhen one profits
.

.

from directinfringementwhile declining to exercise a rightto stop orlim itit.' Luvdarts,

ting Grokster,545
LLC B.A T& F M obility,LLC,710 F.3d 1068,1071 (9th Cir.2013)(ci
24

Forinstance, as indicated inthe DMCA context,Hotfil
e's masterfile policy(which

removed offending links butnotthe actualfile)may mean that Hotfile knew of

padicularinfringing files and failed to barfudheraccess. Hotfile willalso have to
explain how ,in each ofthese instances,itwas unaware ofthe offending nature
of the activity, did not intend to contribute to it,and could not utilize existing
technology to prevent infringem ent. Finally, to the extent that the Studios
prem ise Iiability on the factthatHoiile provided the m echanism forinfringem ent,
Hotfile has suggested Sony/8efam ax-type noninfringing uses forthe system ,and
there is a question ofwhetherthose uses are dssubstantial.''

25

Although a defendant's Iack ofknowledge m ay notaffectliability in this context,it
does have im plications for the m easure of damages available under the

CopyrightAct. See 17 U.S.C.j 504(c)(2)(providing thatstatutorydamages may
range from $750 to $30,000 per violation, but capping willful violations at
$150,000 perviolationl;see also EMIAprilMusic,Inc.v.W hite,618 F.Supp.2d
497,507 (E.D.Va.2009)(citing Nelson-salabes,Inc.?.Morningside Dev.,LLC,
284 F.3d 505,517 (4th Cir.2002)).
78

Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 79 of 99

U.S.at930).
,A&M Records,Inc.,239 F.3d at1022. The determination ofwhethera
defendant has the capacity to halt infringem ent is determ ined by exam ining the
system 's ù
'currentarchitecture.' Napsfer,239 F.3d at1024.

Hotile contends that the Studios cannot show a ''direct financialbenefit' from
infringem ent because Hotfile charges a fixed rate to users through subscriptions and
does notprofit increm entally from infringement. Hotfile's argum ent rests on an early

Internet case, Religious Technology Center

Netcom On-Line Comm unication

Services,Inc.,907 F.Supp.1361 (N.D.Cal.1995),in which a memberofa religious
organization posted the plaintiffs' copyrighted works to a com puter bulletin board

service. Id. at 1365-66. Those works were autom atically copied to the defendant's
com puterby the service and thereby m ade available to users who paid the defendanta
fixed subscription fee. Id. at 1365-68. The coud concluded that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to prevailon theirvicarious liability claim because the link between infringem ent
and revenue was notsufficiently established. Id.at1376-77.
Notably, howeverrthe Netcom coud did not rule that a fixed fee could never
provide a directbenefitbasis forvicarious liability. Instead,the courtobserved thatthe

plaintiffs failed to show thatthe policy at issue enhanced dlthe value of (defendant's)

services to subscribers or attractledl new subscribers,''in light of the fact thatthe
defendantwas m erely an entity providing Internetaccess to users. Id.at1377. Indeed,
the only evidence ofsuch a Iink consisted ofa declaration from plaintiffs'counselstating

thatthe defendantwas concerned itwould Iose business ifan injunction were to be
granted on the infringem entclaims.

The coud found such evidence insulicientto

show the type offinancialtie required. 1d.
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By contrast,othercouds have perm itted liability where the financialbenefitwas
even m ore attenuated than here. In Arista Records LLC v.Usenet.com , Inc.,633 F.

Supp.2d 124 (S.D.N.Y.2009),the coud rejected an argumentthatcausation was not
established S'because (the defendants)are paid on a per-volume,not per-download,
basis and because infringing m usic accounts for less than 1% of the newsgroups

available on theirservice.'' Id.at 157. Likewise,in the Ninth Circuit's Napsterdecision,
an increase in user base - i.e.,m ore user registrations - due to the increasing quality

y benefitted from
and quantity of available m usic m eant that the defendants financiall
infringem ent such that they were Iiable. 239 F.3d at 1023 (quoting l
ower coud

decision).
The Napster case posits that only a causalrelationship between infringem ent
and profitm ustbe established Ilregardless ofhow substantialthe benefitis in propodion

to a defendant's overallprofits.'' Ellison v,Robertson,357 F,3d 1072,1079 (9th Cir.

2004). In otherwords,llthe law is clearthatto constitute a directfinancialbenefit,the
'draw 'ofinfringem entneed notbe the prim ary,oreven significant,draw - rather,itonly
need be 'a'draw.'' Usenetcom ,lnc.,633 F.Supp.2d at157. As one observernoted

aftera review ofmany ofthese cases,'laltpresent,the dominantview is thatany for
profit enterprise could be found vicariously Iiable for copyright infringem ent however
rem ote, unquantifiable, and unidentifiable the benefit

receives from copyright

infringem ent m ay be.'' Craig A.Grossm an,From Sony to Grokster,the Failure ofthe

CopyrightDoctrines ofContributory Infringem entand Vicarious Liability to Resolve the
> ar between Content and Destructive Technologies, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 141, 230-31

(2005).
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The Court has already concluded that questions rem ain regarding whetherthe
financialbenefit Hotfile received and the design of i
ts business m odelare sufficientto
im pute intent to induce copyright infringem entatthis stage Butthe vicarious Iiability
.

standard requires neitherthata defendanthave knowledge ofthe acts of infringem ent
northat the defendant receive substantialfinancialbenefi
t from infringem ent Hotfile
.

concedes thatinfringem entdid occuron its system and, while itargues thatits support
forinfringementw ould not have made business sense, itacknowledges thatinfringing
files drove som e am ountofsales to Hotfile,as show n by the Zebrak classifications and
W aterm an calculations. The infringement-sales connection is also indicated by the

dram atic drop in Hotfile's income after the Com plaint was filed and after Hotfile

im plemented itsthree-strikes policy and technologiesto ferretoutinfringers. (See,e.g.,

Yeh Decl.Ex.70 (DE 288-82 (filed underseall;DE 324-13).) Hotfile may contend that
infringem ent was not central to its success, but it is undeniable that it financially

benefitted from it by attracting some users. This is sufficient to subject Hotfile to
vicarious Iiability underthe firstprong ofthe analysis.

As forthe second prong - the rightto controluserconductand failure to do so Hotfile contends thatthere is a triable issue because Hotfile's content-neutralapproach

m eantthatHotfile could notdeterm ine which files were infringing,thereby depriving itof
the ability to controlthe infringem ent. However,a reading ofthe comm on Iaw standard
suggests that couds have viewed this element expansively, finding that service

providers have the capacity to controlthe activities of their users sim ply by vidue of
providing the m eans to com m itdirectinfringem ent. See,e.g.,Gershwin Publ'g Corp.v.

Columbia Artists Mgmt.,Inc.,443 F.2d 1159,1173 (2d Cir.1971),
.Polygram Int'lPubl'
g
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Inc.v.Nevadag lG,Inc.,855 F.Supp.1314,1328 (D.Mass.1994)(reviewing case law,
quoting the Iegislative history ofthe CopyrightAct,and concluding thata defendanthas
S
scontrol''ifthey l
'eitheractively operate orsupervise the operation ofthe place wherein

the performances occur,orcontrolthe contentofthe infringing programNl.z6
For exam ple,in Usenet.com ,the defendants m aintained online bulletin boards

from which users (with a subscription)could dow nload copyrighted sound recordings.
633 F.Supp.2d at 130-131. As sufficient evidence ofthe right to control,the court
noted that the defendants had a policy that prohibited the sharing of copyrighted
content; m aintained com puter servers that stored and transm itted user-originated

content;possessed the ability to filterorbjock content,including infringing content;and
ldattim es,exercised theirrightand ability to restrict,suspend,orterm inate subscribers,''
such as by suspending accounts ofspam m ers,lim iting the activity ofthose who used a
dispropodionate am ount of resources, and restricting dow nloads of pornographic
m aterial. Id.at131,157. And in the swap m eetcase,albeita non-lnternetcontext,the
site operator could be held vicariously Iiable because i
tf
'patrofled the prem ises,''

26

Itis impodantto note thatSection 512(c)(1)(B)ofthe DMCA excludesfrom safe

harborthose who dsreceive a financialbenefitdirectly attributable to the infringing
activity,in a case in w hich the service providerhas the rightand ability to control

such activity.'' 17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(1)(B). Al
though phrased in a similarway to

the com m on Iaw vicarious Iiability standard,couds have read itin the contextof
otherpodions ofthe DM CA to notforeclose protection forservice providers that

would be vicariously liable forusers'infringing activity (without'dsomething more
than the ability to rem ove or block access to m aterials posted on a service

provider's website''). Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (quotation omittedl; UMG
Recordings,Inc.v.She/lerCapitalPartners LLC,718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.2013).

This not only dem onstrates the breadth of each prong of the com m on Iaw
doctrine,butalso indicates thatthe DM CA precedentHotfile relies on in its brief
is inapplicable to the discussion here. See CapitolRecords,Inc. v.Mp3tunes,

LLC,No.07 Civ.9931 (W HP),2013 W L 1987225,at*10 (S.D.N.Y.May 14,
2013).
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''controlled the access of custom ers to the swap m eet area,''and 'Ihad the right to
term inate vendors forany reason w hatsoeverand through thathad the ability to control
the activities ofvendors on the prem ises.'' Fonovisa,76 F.3d at262.

Beyond the rightto exclude,the ability to controlm ust be realand practical. In
Perfect 10 v. Am azon.com , Inc., for instance, G oogle allowed users to search for

images (including infringing images)on others'websites,butcould not preventthose
websites from posting infringing content and did not possess im age-recognition
technology that could precisely block its users'access to those im ages. 508 F,3d at

1174. The coud stated thatthe alleged offenderm usthave 'dboth a Iegalrightto stop or
Iim itthe directly infringing conduct,as wellas the practicalability to do so.'' Id.at 1175.

Thus,Google was notvicariously liable because itcould notcontrolthe activities ofthe

direct infringers (although it could have been contributorily Iiable to the extent it
materially assisted them). Id.at1174-75. And in Luvdarts,LLC,the Ninth Circuitruled
that m obile wireless carriers could not be held vicariously Iiable for the acts of their

subscribers w ho allegedly shared access to plaintiffs'protected works. 71O F 3d at
1071-72. Even though the infringem ent occurred overthe service networks that the

defendants ran,the defendants had no way ofsupervising useractivity orim plem enting
a system to preventinfringem ent.
The analysis here,based on precedent,is straightforward. Hotfile controls the

m eans of infringem entby am ong otherthings m andating user registration and hosting
the infringing m aterials on its own servers. CL Am azon.com , Inc.,508 F.3d at 1174

(distinguishing Napsfer,239 F.3d at 1023-24). Moreover,Hotfile has a stated policy
that permits itto controluser activity (and,as in Fonovisa,to exclude users) and
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Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 84 of 99

m aintains thatithas exercised thatcontrolin policing content. Hotfile has also adopted
technology that it claim s is effective in filtering and targeting infringing works. These
actions,w hich benefitHotfile in an assessm entofdirectIiability,belie Hotfile's argument
thatitIacks controlbecause ithas no search function and no way to identify orremove
infringing files. lt is also clearthat priorto the filing ofthe Com plaint,Hotfile failed to

properly exercise its controlin lightofthe num berofusers w ho were blatantly infringing
and the estim ates ofthe Studios'expeds regarding the prevalence ofprotected content
available fordownload. Accordingly,on this record,the Studios have m ade a case for

vicarious liability,and summaryjudgmentisentered in theirfavor.
C.

Anton Titov's IndividualLiability

In addition to the corporate entity,Hotfile Corp.,the Studios have sued Titov in

his individualcapacity,seeking to extend any dam ages that m ay be awarded against

Hoiile. Titov has filed a separate motion forsummary judgmenton the issue of his
liability. In this Circuit,''a corporate officerw ho directs,controls,ratifies,padicipates in,
or is the m oving force behind the infringing activity, is personally liable for such

infringement.'' BabbitElecs.,Inc.v.Dynascan Corp.,38 F.3d 1161,1184 (11th Cir.

1994) (citation omittedl'
, Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.

Assoc. Tel. Directory

Publishers,756 F.2d 801,811 (11th Cir.1985).W hile much ofthis precedentconcerns
corporations that directly violate others'copyrights,it is equally applicable to entities

Iiable forsecondary infringement. See Usenet.com ,633 F.Supp.2d at158-59 (holding
thatdirectorand sole shareholderof com panies operating online bulletin boards w here

infringem ent occurred was liable under theories of direct and secondary liability for

copyrightinfringement). The secondary infringementtheory focuses on the effectthe
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individualhad on the deci
sion to commitinfringementand looks beyond the corporate

form and principles oflimited liability. See BabbitElecs.,lnc.,38 F.3d at1184 (citation

omitted).
Al
ternatively, a pefson m ay be Iiable under a vicarious liability theory if he is
responsible for supervising the infringing activity and benefits from it, even if he is
'ignorant ofthe infringem ent.'' Southern BeII
,756 F.2d at811 (citations omi
ttedl;see

also Gershwin Pub'
g Co.,443F.2dat1162 CForexampie,apersonwho haspromoted
orinducedthe infringingactsofthe performerhas beenheldjointlyand severall
y Iiable
as a tvicarious' infringer, even though he has no actual know ledge that copyright

monopolyisbeingimpaired.'')Ascouftshaverecognized,
A corporate officerm ay be held vicariously liable underthe CopyrightAct

when; (1)the officerpersonallyparticiqatedintheactualinfringement'
,or
(2)the officerderived financialbenefltfrom the infringing activities as
ei
ther a major shareholder in the corporation,or through some other
m eans such as receiving a percentage of tbe revenues from the ad ivity

giving rise to the infringement'
:or(3)the offi
cerused the corporation as an
instrumentto carry outa dellberate infringementofcopyright,
.or(4)the
officerwas the dom inantinfluence in the com oration,and determ ined the

policies which resulted in the infringement'
,or (5)on the basis ofsome
com bination ofthe above criteria.

Matvin Music Co.k'
.8HC Ltd.P'
ship,830 F.Supp.651,654-55 (D.Mass.1993)
(summarizing case Iaw)(quotation omitted).
Defendants attem pt to m inim ize Titov's role,arguing that he is an ''engineer,''
t'technologist,''''em ployee,' or ''accountantv''rather than a key officer, involved onl
y in

'droutine''adm inistrative m atters;thathe did not provide the starbup capi
talor conceive
of the i
dea forHofile'
,thathe holds no sway overHotfile eitheratthe top-levelorwith
respectto its day-to-day operations'
,and that

'

Defendants'argum ent rests both on an assertion thatTi
tov
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did not have personalinvolvem ent in the decisions giving rise to liability and that the
group dynam ic and the presence of m ore culpable figures

m ean thatTitov could nothave had the requisite degree ofcontroloverthe
com pany's decisions to warrantIiability.

Defendants illustrate theirargum ent by ci
ting M ozingo v.CorrectM anufacturing

Corporation,752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir.1985),which involved a products Iiability claim
against a work platform m anufacturerand its president. There,the plaintiffestablished
that the product was defecti
ve at trial,but the district coud directed a verdict on the
issue of the president's personalIiability,applying a M ississippidoctrine thatrequkres
thatan officer'directly participates in orauthorizes the com m ission ofa tort'' ld.at171The evidence showed that the president organi
zed and ow ned predecessor

com panies that m anufactured the defective product. /d. at 172-73. Moreover,the
president expressed ''som e reservations concerning the unit's safety'' during i
ts
developm ent - possibly touching on the nature of the defect - and ''authorized the
production of a slngle prototype unit.'' /d. at 173. Nevertheless, the district coud
characterized his involvem ent in the development and m anufacturing processes as
'
tperipheral' and cited his lack of awareness thatthe productwas putinto production.

Id.at174. In affirming,the Fi
fth Circui
treasoned that''gilfEthe presjdent)can be held
personally liable in this case,any corporate officerwho fails to m aintain an alm osttotal

ignorance of the products the corporation prodtlces m ay be personally Iiable in the
eventa defective productis produced.'' ld.

27

The studios explain that they have not brought sui
t againstthese shareholders
because Hotfile proffered Titov as its public face and the Studios only recently
discovered these shareholders'identi
ties.
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However,authority involving copyright infringem entis notas stringentin holding

relevant corporate principals Iiable. For exam ple, in Quartet M usic 7. Kissim m ee

Broadcasting,Inc.,795 F.Supp.110O (M.D.Fla.1992),a group ofmusic publishers
broughtsuitagainsta radio station and its presidentforbroadcasting m usic in a m anner

inconsistentwith a Iicensing agreem ent. Id.at 1101. Issuing a decision aftera bench

trial,the courtjuxtaposed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Southern Belland two
districtcoud cases,WarnerBrothers Inc.B.LobsterPotInc.,582 F.Supp.478 (N.D.

Ohio 1984),which imposed Iiability againsta presidentwho oversaw a restaurantwhere
unauthorized perform ances ofm usic were held,and 8roadcasfMusic,Inc.v.Behulak,

651 F.Supp.57,61 (M .D.Fla.1986),which,by contrast,immunized a corporate officer
who was m erely a 'ssilentpadner''in the Iounge where infringem entoccurred. Quartet
M usic,795 F.Supp.at1103-04. The coud concluded thatthe presidentwas iiable for
copyrightinfringem entnotwithstanding his corporate role because ofhis participation in
the activities ofthe business and the conductatissue;he had been involved in litigation
concerning sim ilar claim s, his com pany had been given notice of the alleged
infringement,he ran the radio station's operations,and he had the rightto supervise the
infringing activity. Id.at1104.

W hile Quartet M usic involved a single owner with exclusive control over the

infringing activities,one judge in this districthas observed thatççsouthern Belldoes not
require ul
tim ate authority, nor does it require only one person to have authority.'

Foreign Imported Prods. & Publ'
g, Inc. v.Grupo Indus.Hotelero, S.A.,No.07-22066

CIV,2008 W L 4724495,at *14 (S.D.Fla.Oct.24,2008). Numerous other couds
suppod thatproposition. See,e.g., Colum bia Pictures Indus.,Inc.v.Redd H orne,Inc.,
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749 F.2d 154,160 (3d Cir. 1984) (aftirming order imposing Iiabili
ty againstboth the
president and sole shareholder ofa defendant entity,as w ellas his brother,who was

not a stockholder or officer but gave the im pression that he was a principal in the

business venturel;Pickwick Music Corp.v.Record Prods.,Inc.,292 F.Supp.39,41

(S,D,N.Y.1968)(findingIiabilityforthreedefendantswhoformed and ranacorporation,
although they had different responsibilities for recording, editing, and selling an

infringing record, but not two others who had Gpe#orm ed m erely m inisterial office

functionsf), 'Corporate officers have been held Iiable for the copyright infringement
com m itted by theircorporate entity in a variety ofsituations.' BlendingwellM usic,Inc.b',

Moor-Law,Inc.,612 F.Supp.474,482 (D.Del.1985)(parentheticallycitingexamples).
By contrast,Defendants pointto no precedent suggesting thata m ultitude of culpable
actors - and thus,the lack ofa single 'icentralfigure'
'- is determ inative ofliability.
M oreover, Defendants'contention that the padicular facts of this case m ake it
incom parable to any otheris unpersuasive,since the hallm arks ofpadicipati
on,control,
and benefitare undeniably presenthere. First,Titov i
s a high-ranking,centralfigure at
Hotfile. He owns a stake in the com pany nearly as Iarge as i
ts other
and runs it in equalpart;

shareholders

and govern Hotfile by

consensus, In his rol
e,Titov has advanced,rejected,agreed upon orfailed to block
every decision thathas shaped the com pany,including the efforts Hotfile tookto identify

and rem ove infringing content,'im pl
em enting and eventually elim inating the m aster5l
e
poiicy, and deciding how to reward Hotfile's affiliates. Moreover, Titov

was indispensable in the company's formati
on,crucialto the
developm ent of i
ts business m odel, and continues to be involved in its business
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strategy. Titov acknow ledges possessing powerofattorney forthe com pany and acting
as its m anagerw hen authori
zed.

In additi
on, Ti
tov has personally had a hand in every aspect of the conduct
underpinning the Studios'theories of liability in this case. For exam ple,atthe outset,
Titov wrote the program m ing code that runs the Hotfile interface and enables direct

infringers to upload and download protected works. M ore recently, he undertook a
m anagem entrole in which he oversees contractors working forHotfile and padicipates
in m aintaining Hotfile's storage and deli
very technology. Ti
tov also has a signi
ficant
im pact in his work for Hotfile's related entities. He is the sole owner, m anager and
directorof Lem uria,which owns and m aintains the servers on w hich the infringing files

at issue are stored, and he is the m anaging director of Hotfile Ltd.,which collects
subscription fees from users and pays affiliates. Together,these com panies provide
m echanism s necessary for Hotfile to'collect its revenue, for i
ts users to access its
services,and forthe entire system to sustain business and grow.
The Studios have also pointed to specific evidence showing Titov's actual
awareness of infringem enton Hotfile's network. Forexam ple,he understood from his
conversati
ons w ith

that Hotfile acquired users m igrating from Rapidshare

w ben that network was sued for infringem ent. He also expressed the concern that

Hotfile w ould becom e the ''
flagship'
' for non-licensed content and was a party to
comm unications claim ing that certain files were infringing. Signi
ficantly,Ti
tov appears

on nearly every docum entthatthe Couft considered in determ ining liability. Titov also
putin place Hotfile's DM CA agent,who received m illions ofinfringem entnotices. Thus,

while the Courtacknowledges thatTitov may nothave gone so far as to personally

89

Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 90 of 99

engage in acts ofdirect infringem ent,and thatany one of his functions m ightnotgive
rise to Iiability on its own,the totality ofthe circum stances suppods Iiability. In contrast
to other cases, his role js not peripheral, his function is not that of m erely a silent

shareholderorordinaryemployee,and hisduties are notjustministerial.
The Studios have shown sufficient financialbenefitand controlfor the Coud to
conclude that Titov is Iiable under a vicarious Iiability theory. Vvith regard to the first
requirem ent - financial benefit - the evidence shows that as the com pany earned

money from new subscriptions (some podion ofwhichwasattributable to the availability

ofinfringing materials),so did Titov. Titov also instructed empfoyees to ban one user,
dem onstrating his abili
ty to block or exclude Hotfile's clientele. And, as noted
previously,the record shows Titov's im pact in determ ining Hotfile's policies and his
dom inantinfluence on the corporation. To the extentthatHotfile can be found Iiable on
any ofthe theories discussed above,the Courtfinds thatTitov was a criticalactorin the
underlying operations. Thus,there are no disputed facts that preclude a finding that
Titov is vicariously Iiable forthe acts ofinfringem entoccurring on Hotfile's network.
In a finaleffod to avoid Iiability,Defendants contend thatTitov - a Russian citizen

who resides in Bulgaria - is notsubjectto personaljurisdiction in Florida. Ti
tov has
advanced this assedion atleasttwice in this case: as a defense in his Answerand by

asking the Studios notto serve him while he attended mediation in this jurisdiction.
However,Titov failed to address the issue in the m otion to dism iss he filed on M arch 31,

2011 (DE 50),which challenged only whetherthe Complaint stated a claim for relief
underFederalRule ofCivilProcedure 12(b)(6). FederalRule ofCivilProcedure 12(h)
provides thata pady waives cedain defenses thatcould have been raised underRule
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12(b)- such as Iack of personaljurisdiction - by failing to interpose them in the first
pleading. Rule 12(h) is explicit, requires compliance, and means that Titov has

procedurallywaived the personaljurisdiction issue. See,e.g.,Boston Telecom m s.Grp.,
Inc. v. Deloitte Touche Tohm atsu,249 F.App'x 534, 537 (9th Cir.2007) (reversing

districtcourt's finding ofnon-waiverofpersonaljurisdiction where counselhad notseen
a copy ofthe com plaint,moved to dism iss forinsufficiency ofprocess,and stated that

he reserved the righttofile asupplementalmotionto dismiss).
M oreover,a Iong Iitany of cases establishes the com m on Iaw principle that a

pady waives such a defense by appearing generally and Ii
tigating the m erits ofa claim ,
as Titov has done here. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland; Ltd. v. Com pagnie des

Bauxites de Guinee,456 U.S.694,706 (1982)(noting thatwhere personaljurisdiction is
Iacking, the defendant has the choice of ignoring the proceedings and raising a
collateralchallenge in enforcement proceedings or appearing specifically to challenge

personaIjurisdictionl.z8 Afterstumbling upon a personaljurisdiction challenge buried
deep in the summary judgment briefing,the Coud finds no indication that Titov is
28

In Gerber v Riordan,649 F.3d 514 (6th Ci
r.2011),for example,a pro se
.

defendantfiled a motion to dismiss forIack ofpersonaljurisdiction,which was
denied for proceduralreasons. The defendant then obtained an attorney who
entered an appearance,m oved to stay pending arbitration,sought to vacate a

default judgment that had been entered, opposed a request for mediation,
padicipated in a case m anagementand pretrialconference,soughtto enforce a
settlem entagreem ent,and engaged in discovery. Id.at518-19. Afternoting the
Iack of precedent in the area, the coud considered whether filings and

appearances thatare distinctfrom jurisdictionalchallenges - such as anything
thatwould d'cause the coud to go to some effod thatwould be wasted i
fpersonal

jurisdiction is Iaterfound Iacking''- waive a personaljurisdiction defense. Id.at
519 (citations and quotation om itted). W hile some ofthose actions mighthave
indicated that the pady did not submit to the coud's jurisdiction or that the
defendantsoughtm erely to postpone the case,the filing ofa generalappearance

'constituted avoluntaryacceptance ofthe districtcoud'sjurisdiction.''
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avoiding a defense ofthe suiton the m erits. To the contrary,in asserting defenses,
filing m otions related to the record,and personally attending oralargum ent,Titov has

subm itted to - has invoked - the jurisdiction ofthis Coud. The Coud finds Titov's
contentions thatthis was the ''firstavailable oppodunity'
'to raise the issue and thatthe
Studios l
'have waived any waiver argum ent''disingenuous. If any issue could be
deem ed waived,this is and he has.

D.

Hotfile's Counterclaim

And finally, the Courtturns to Hotfile's counterclaim against Plainti
ffW arner.

Notices ofinfringem entare a prom inentfeature ofthe DM CA. The statute spells outsix
elem ents fora notice to be effective,specifies requirem ents the service providerm ust
m eetso thatitm ay properly receive notice,requires service providers to acton receipt

of notices such as by rem oving infringing users'content,and provides a procedure for
challenging copyright ow ners' designations. Providing the Iegal basis for Hotfile's

counterclaim,Section 512(9 sets outa private cause ofactionforanyone who is injured
by a m aterialrepresentation thatcontentoractivity is infringing w hen itis not:
Any person who knowingly m aterially m isrepresents underthis section . .
thatm aterialoractivity is infringing
shallbe liable forany dam ages,
including costs and attorneys'fees,incurred by the alleged infringer,by
any copyright ow ner or copyright ow ner's authorized Iicensee,or by a

service provider,who isinjured by such misrepresentation,asthe resultof
the service provider relying upon such m isrepresentation in rem oving or
disabling access to the m aterialor activity claim ed to be infringing,or in
replacing the removed m aterialorceasing to disable access to it.

17 U.S.C.j 512(9.
Section 512(c),dealing with the creation of notices,requires that notices be
accompanied by ''(aJstatementthatthe complaining pady has a good faith beliefthat
use of the m aterialin the m anner com plained of is not authorized by the copyright
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owner,its agent,orthe law.'' 17 U.S.C.j 512(c)(3)(A)(v). Nonetheless,Section 51249
does not im pose liability for issuing a defective notice per se,only for making false

claim s of infringem ent. According to the statute's Iegislative history, the subsection
''establishes a right of action against any person who knowingly m isrepresents that
m aterialoractivity is infringing'
'and ''is intended to deterknowingly false allegations to
service providers in recognition that such m isrepresentations are detrim entalto rights

holders,service,providers,and lnternetusers.'' S.Rep.No.105-190 (1998)at50. In
this regard,Hotfile claim s thatW arnerhad actualknowledge thatthe identified notices
were false and asseds that it was dam aged as a result. W arner, conversely, has

moved for summary judgment on the ground that Hoiile cannot make a sufficient
showing to establish its claim .
Prelim inarily, the padies, Iike the Coud, have grappled with several issues

surrounding enforcementofSection 512(9,which is notwellunderstood. See Ground

Zero Museum W orkshop ?.Wilson,813 F.Supp.2d 678,704 (D.Md.2011)('
dThere is
nota greatdealof case law interpreting (Section 512(9).'')*
,UMG Recordings,/k7c.
Augusto,558 F.Supp.2d 1055,1065 (C.D.Cal.2008),aff'
d on othergrounds,628 F.3d

1175 (9th Cir.2011)(noting Iluncedainty''in the area ofIaw). Forinstance,both sides

recognize that the statute requires actual, subjective knowledge of the fact of
noninfringem entatthe time thata takedown notice is m ade,based upon the theory that

one cannot know ingly m isrepresentwhat one does not understand to be false. See

Rossi v.Motion Picture Ass'n ofAm., Inc.,391 F.3d 1000,1004-05 (9th Cir.2004)

(holding that the statute t'encompasses a subjective, rather than objective
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(reasonableness!standard ). Indeed,mistakes,evenlunreasonable''mistakes,donot
necessarilycallforIiabili
ty,solongastheyarehonestlybelieved./d.(citing 17 U.S.C.j
512(9).
But Hotsle asks whether certain ''
egregi
ous''attributes ofW arner's system that

mighthave prevented itfrom acquidng subjective knowledge (such as

unjustlyinsulateW arnerfrom Iiabilityforunreasonablemistakes.Compare,e.g.,Online
Policy Grp.v.Diebold,Inc.,337 F.Supp.2d 1195,1204 (N.D.Cal.2004)('''Knowingly'
m eans thata pady actually knew ,should have known ifitacted with reasonable care or
diligence,orwould have had no substantialdoubthad itbeen acting in good faith,thatit

was making misrepresentations.''),with Cabell,2010W L996007,at*4 ('
elNlegligence is

notthe standard forIiability undersection 512(9.''(citationomittedl),and Augusto,558
F.Supp.2d at1065 (holding thatallegationsthatthe counterclaim-defendant'should
have known betterdo notcreate a genuine issue ofmaterialfacto). Hotfile also asks

29

ln R ossi1 which is the case cited mostoften in thisarea,the ownerofa website
directory sued a m ovie studio trade association thatfollowed the DM CA'S nctice
and takedown procedures, contending that any reasonable investigation of his
website would have revealed thatitdid notIink to infringing content. Id.at1003.

Considering Section 512(9's express Ianguage and interpretive case law dealing
wi
th a wide variety of sim ilarl
y-w orded statutes,the Ninth Circuit held that the

statuteemploysanobjective standard and ruled againstthe plaintiff./d.at100405(statingthatthe statuteprotects''potentialviolatorsfrom subjectivelyimproper
actions by copyright owners'
'). lnstead of subjective knowledge of
noninfringem ent, one of the association's m em bers notified it of possible

infringements on the subjectwebsi
te and the website i
tselfsuggesled to users
thatprotected movies could be downloaded byjoining. /J. The clearIessonof
Rossiisthat''asa prerequisite to Iiabili
tyundersection 512(9,a defendantmust
have actualknowledge thatitis m aking a m isrepresentation offact.'' Cabell k'.

Zimmerman,No.09Civ.10134(CM),2010W L996007,at*4 (S.D.N.Y.Mar.12,
2010)(citationsomitted).
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whether

can raise an inference thatW arner is liable forpossessing guilty knowledge or
supportIiability undera willfulblindness theory.

Some couds have cited Section 512(c)to suggestIiabilitywhere a partydid not
develop a '
igood fai
th''or''sumcient'basis to believe infringementbefore submitting a

notice. See Dudnikov v.MGA Entm At,Inc.,410 F.Supp.2d 1010,1013 (D.Colo.2005)

(holding,in the contextofa Section 512(9 claim,thatthe defendant''
was required to
show thatithad a sufficientbasis to form the required good faith beliefthatthe plaintiffs'

auction infringed on its rights,and thatits actions therefore com plied with the notice and

takedown requirements underthe DMCAI;butsee Al
Jg&x
9/o,558 F.Supp.2d at1065
(''
congress included an expressly Iimi
ted cause ofaction for improperinfringennent
notifications, im posing liability only if a copyright owner's notificati
on is a knowing

m isrepresentation.'(quotation and citations omittedll.3o One coud,in a series offour
decisions, w ent so far as to hold that prior to subm itting a takedown notice, the
copyrightholderm ustconsidernot only whetherthe m aterialactualîy belongs to it,but
w hether the use of the m ateriallacks an obviously Iawfulpurpose like fair use. See

Lenz 7.UniversalMusic Com .,572 F.Supp.2d 115O (N.D.Cal.2008) (''Lel7z J')

(denying motion to dismissl;Lenz v.UniversalMusic Corp.,No.C07-3783 JFIIRS),
2008 W L 4790669 (N.D.Cal.Oct.28,2008)('Le?7z //'')(denying motion forinterlocutory

appeall;Lenz v.UniversalMusic Co@.,No.C07-3783 JF,2010W L 702466 (N.D.Cal.
30

Rossi itself noted the fact that the defendant in that case had not actually
dow nloaded the files,butwenton to describe othercom pelling facts thatIed the
defendantto believe thatinfringem entofi
ts works was occurring.
95

Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW Document 534 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013 Page 96 of 99

Feb.25,2010)LuLenz #/''
)(granting plaintiffsmotionforpartialsummaryjudgmenton
affirm ative defensesl;Lenz v.UniversalMusic Corp.,No.5:07-cv-O3783-JF,2013 W L

271673 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (Ml-enz IV') (denying motions for summary
judgmentl.3l
Thus,ifW arnerhad som e sim ilartype ofduty,itm ightfind i
tselfvulnerable to suit
because its pre-notice review
M oreover,even ifits methodology
w ere reliable,W arner was concerned with determ ining whether it owned the works

ratherthan w hetherthe use ofthe works infringed on its copyrights to supporta proper

512(c)claim. See Sonym etamax,464 U.S.at433('lAlnyone ...who makesafairuse
ofthe work is notan infringerofthe copyrightwith respectto such use.');Amaretto
31

in that case, Stephanie Lenz,a userofthe lnternetvideo hosting site YouTube,
uploaded a video of herfam ily dancing to a song perform ed by the m usic adist
Prince,w hich turned out to be wildly popufar am ong viewers. Lenz 1, 57,
2 F.
Supp.2d at 1162. The ow nerof the song,UniversalM usic Corporation,sent a
takedow n notice to the service provider,which notified M s.Lenz that hervideo
had been rem oved because of a claim ofcopyrightinfringem ent, Id. Discovery
revealed thatUniversalhad an em ployee who was tasked with using YouTube's
system to search fortitles ow ned or adm inistered by Universal. Lenz IV'2013
W L 271673,at *1. He stated that he issued a takedown notice whenever he
could recognize a one second orIongerportion ofa Prince song in any video.as
occurred in the video at i
ssue. Id.at*5. His boss stated thatUniversalseeks to
rem ove songs ''when a writer is upset or reguests that padicular videos be
rem oved from Youl-ube,'prom pting Universalto conducta review . Id.

The court concluded that summary judgment in favor of either party was
im proper. Ms.Lenz could show thatUniversal's procedures m ight have w illfully

blinded it to knowledge of her fair use, but not that Universal subjectively
believed that there was a high probabili
ty that the video w as Iawfulorthat the

nature offairuse was self-evident. Id.at*6-7 (citing Viacom,676 F.3d at34).
Likewise,Universalcould notdemonstrate the absence ofsubjective intent. /J.
at*8.
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Ranch Breedables,LLC v.Ozimals,Inc.,79O F.Supp.2d 1024,1029 (N.D.Cal.2011)
(noting thata Section 512(9 plaintiffcancontestthe validityofa takedown notification
even where a valid copyright exists). And, W arner's reliance on technology to
accomplish the task m ightpreventitfrom form ing any beliefatall,as the amicus cudae
argues here and a si
m ilar group asserted in Rosst ''com puters condtlcting autom ated
searches cannotform a beliefconsistentwi
th the Ianguage ofthe DM CA,because they

cannotdistinguish between infringing contentand contentthatmerely contains words
that suggest infringem ent.'' Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 n.7. The Cotlrt! however, is

unaware of any decision to date that actually addressed the need for hum an review ,
and the statute does not specify how belief of infringem ent m ay be form ed or what
know ledge m ay be chargeabl
e to the notifying entity.
Ultim ately,w hile these are engaging questions surrounding W arner's know ledge'
,

its responsibility to investigate'
,whetherithad a good faith beliefin infringem entin each
instance'
,and whose burden i
tis to show orrefute what- alIissues offirstim pression in

this Circuit - there is sufficient evidence

the record to suggest that W arner

intenti
onally taréeted files itknew ithad no rightto remove. This precludes sum mary
judgmentin its favor. Specifically,Hotfile has provided the example ofJDownloader,
W hich W arner did not m anage

'

'

lt has also show n W arner's interest in an application of its

takedow n rights beyond works that i
tow ns. And W arnerhas nototherw ise argued that
it had the right to rem ove those files,only that its m istakes should be excused. The

Coud finds this motive and otherevidence sufficientto sustain an inference thatW arner

violatedSection51249,suchthattheseissuesshouldbepresentedto thejury.
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The only issue remaining is whetherHotfile is able to show any injury forthe

deletions,which is an elementofa Section 512(9 claim and which W arnerquestions.
1
$A fair reading of the statute, the Iegislative history, and sim ilar statutory Ianguage

indicates that j 512(9 plaintiff's damages must be proximately caused by the
m isrepresentation to the service provider and the service provider'
s reliance or? the

misrepresentation.'' Lenz 111,2010 W L 702466,at*1O (emphasis in original). In this
regard,the Coud observes thatthe quantity ofeconom ic dam ages to Hotfile's system is

necessarily difficult to measure with precision and has Ied to m uch disagreem ent

between the padies and theirexpeds. Notwithstanding this difficulty,the factofinjury
has been shown,and Hotfile's exped can provide the jury with a non-speculative basis
to assess dam ages. Additionally,Lenz IIIconcluded thatthe subsection provides for
dam ages beyond actualdam ages,even ifthey are notsubstantial. Id.at*7-10. C)n this

basis,the Coud concludes thatW arneris unable to establish the absence ofa genuine

dispute onthe issue ofdam ages and cannotprevailatthisjuncture.
111.

CO NC LUSION

ln accordance with the foregoing,it is hereby O RDERED AND ADJUDG ED as
folIows:

(1)

Hotfile's motion forpadialsummary judgmentforpost-complaintDMCA

protection (DE 275,DE 318),DefendantAntonTi
tov's motionforsummary
judgmenton personalIiability (DE 276,DE 316),and W arner's motion for
summary judgment as to Hotfile's counterclaim (DE 255, DE 301) are
DEN IED .
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(2)

Plaintiffs'motion forsummaryjudgment(DE 280,DE 322)is GRANTED
as to the issues ofDefendants'DM CA defense,vicarious Iiabili
ty,and M r.
Titov's Iiability' ltis DENIED in allotherrespects.

(2)

Exceptto the extent addressed herein,Defendants'm otions to strike Dr.
strike Dr. Foster's reply

W aterman's rebuttal repod (DE

declaration(DE 452,DE 460)and certainexhibi
ts(DE 339)inconnection

with Plaintiffs'summaryjudgmentbriefing;and to strike certainexhibits in
connection with Plaintiffs'opposition to Mr.Titov's summary judgment
motion (DE 371),are DENIED AS MOOT. Similarl
y,Plaintiffs'motion to
strike portions ofthe decjarations ofDr.Andrew Crom ady,Dr.Boyle,and

Mr.Titov(DE 387,DE423)isDENIED AS MOOT.

(4) W arner's motionto use an exhibitfrom Mr.Titov's deposition attrial(DE
241,DE 297)is GRANTED,and Plaintiffs'Objecti
onsto Judge Turnoff's
Repod and Recommendati
on (DE

DE 370) are OVERRULED.

Judge Turnoff's Repod and Recommendation (DE 306) is ADOPTED
AND A FFIR M ED.

(5)

The padies shallconferand provide to the Coud proposed rèdactions to
this Orderwithin fourteen (14)days ofthe date ofthi
s Order,so thatthe
Courtcan issue a public version ofthis decision.

DO NE AND OR DERED in cham bers in M iam i,Florida,th'

day of August,

2013.

L
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